At 9:39 AM +0100 2/20/01, Philippe Gervaix wrote:
>Funny how there seems to be such a consensus (for once - except for Louis'
>Schmier so far) among psychologists as to the distinction and definition or
>both fields.
Makes sense, since Louis is a historian, not a psychologist.
Things can always be made more complex (finer discriminations and all that,
but the bottom line is:
Do any philosophers engage in the systematic collection of data, and use it
to justify their statements?
(approaching the question as a behavioral psychologist analyzing
the behavior of philosophers and psychologists, rather than as an analytic
philosopher analyzing the thoughts of psychologists and philosophers).
>One or two remarks though, worth my two cents as a graduate in both fields.
>Fisrt, I must say that the debate between both is far from closed for me,
>and a training both in philosophy and psychology doesn't give anyone's
>position a higher status.
>The definitons given have all been given in the singular, as though there
>was one recognised and admitted definition of what psychology and what
>pohilosophy is. It would be clearer to me if we admitted that the
>definitions given are those of scientific psychology on the one hand and of
>analytic philosophy on the other. There are, beside these, other
>definitions, referring to different fields, traditions, trends, schools, in
>each of these disciplines.
>Both disciplines havce been presented in such a way that philosophy appears
>to be the ground and soil out of which psychology has grown, but then
>acquiered its (alleged) independance ... by its allegence (!) to natural
>sciences. This leads us to the debate between naturalistic sciences and
>human/social sciences, which is still unresolved and much more complicated
>than what an analytical/logical position would have us believe.
>The question is further deepened when we get onto epistemological grounds.
>What assures us that when we define psychology as an empiral rational
>investigation, we are not already taking an epistemological stand that is
>far from "factual" or empirical, or at least pretty much biased?
>It is true that philosophy has lost ground in the past two centuries, and
>that the reaction of philosophers has been (to put it simply) either to take
>refuge in a "higher" position so as to fall back on ontological/speculative
>grounds or to take an arbitral (epsitemological) position so as to remain
>the "queen" of sciences, untouched and spottless.
>In the defense of philosophy, it seeems to me that philosophy does still
>have a critical function -whether within or from outside the field of
>science, depending on the level at which we debate (praxis-level or
>epistemological-level). On the the main goals of philosophy throughout
>history has been the quest and the question of the ground or roots of human
>thinking. Whether be it with Socrates, Descartes, Kant, Husserl, or more
>recently with analytical philosophy or phenomenology, the question
>ultimately comes down to the conditions of possibility and the means by
>which science is possible or is realised.
>So the debate should at least be between two disciplines trying to exert a
>mutual critical dialogue...
* PAUL K. BRANDON [EMAIL PROTECTED] *
* Psychology Dept Minnesota State University, Mankato *
* 23 Armstrong Hall, Mankato, MN 56001 ph 507-389-6217 *
* http://www.mankato.msus.edu/dept/psych/welcome.html *
