Chris Green writes: >"Sided with" was indeed too strong. It is true that Britain was officially >neutral, but they were, shall we say, sympathetic to the South >(entirely on grounds of self-interest -- an independent Confederacy >would be a very weak country, very much dependent on the British >appetite for "CSA" cotton. The remaining USA would be weakened >too, to the benefit of Britain). Britain was involved in a number of >disputed actions during the war (running blockades, making warships, > etc.), each of which "just happened" to favor the Confederacy.[…]
This, I gather, is in line with received American views on the British position on the American Civil war. But is it accurate? In *Great Britain and the American Civil War* (2006) (cited in my previous post) Ephraim Douglas Adams quotes the British historian, George Grote writing: 'The perfect neutrality of [Great Britain] in this destructive war appears to me almost a phenomenon in political history'." Adams goes on to say that this is not the view prevalent in America, and that the question his book sets out to answer is "Did Great Britain in spite of her long years of championship of personal freedom and of leadership in the cause of anti-slavery seize upon the disruption offered in the destruction of the American Union… [and] react only to selfish motives of commercial advantage and national power?" (p. 18) His conclusion from a detailed analysis of the historical evidence is very different from Chris's. Chris mentions "making warships", something I already dealt with in my previous post, showing that an examination of the actual events does not support Chris's interpretation of British Government support for the South. It is certainly not the case that Britain (by which I presume he means the British government) was "sympathetic to the South" – as I already pointed out, the notion that British policy was largely predicated on commercial self-interest (Chris: "the British appetite for 'CSA' cotton") is simplistic and does not tally with close examination of the policies and motivations of the British government as discussed in great detail in Adams's book. Chris write of Britain's "running blockades". On the contrary, Britain accepted the Northern blockade of the South, and any British ships that ran the blockade were not sanctioned, either officially or unofficially, by the British government. So let's look at the historical information in Adams's book in the light of Chris's contentions. Did Britain wish for the success of the South in the Civil War? "In the months preceding the outbreak of the Civil War all British governmental effort was directed toward keeping clear of the quarrel and toward conciliation of the two sections… as the war dragged on, the ministry, pressed from various angles at home, ventured, with much uncertainty, upon a movement looking toward conciliation." (p. 605) Did the British Government "run" the blockade of the South (or unofficially sanction such running of the blockade)? Adams writes, first quoting Lord Russell [British Prime Minister]: "'His Majesty's Government are of the opinion, assuming the blockade is duly notified [etc, etc,], …the fact that various ships may have successfully escaped through it will not of itself prevent the blockade from being an effective one in international law.' From this view Russell never departed in official instructions. England's position as the leading Maritime power made it inevitable that she should immediately approve the American blockade effort and be cautious in criticizing its legitimate operation. Both her own history, and probable future interests, required such a policy far more important in the eyes of statesmen than any temporary injury to British commerce." (p. 273) (That doesn't mean that English merchants would not (and did not) attempt to break the blockade, but it was not the policy of the British government that they should do so.) In February 1862, Adams writes, Prime Minister Russell "gave challenge to pro-Southern sentiment by asserting the effectiveness of the blockade, a challenge almost immediately made known to Parliament by the presentation of papers." In response to a motion in Parliament by sympathisers of the South who argued that the blockade was ineffective, a supporter of Government policy, W.E. Forster, "showed that nearly all the alleged blockade runners were in reality small coasting steamers, which, by use of shallow inner channels, could creep along the shore and then make a dash for the West Indies… To raise the blockade, he argued, would be a direct violation by Britain of her neutrality." (p. 278) Adams later raises an issue he says is "vital" to British home politics, "one the ran like a constant thread through the whole pattern of British attitude toward America.. This was the question of the future of democracy. Was its fate bound up with the future of [the Civil War]? And if so where lay British interest?" (p. 607) This aspect of British policy and public concerns is so important that Adams devotes his last chapter to it. Even in the truncated form on Google Books it is worth looking through as it illustrates again that to view British government policy through the lens of commercial interests does not do justice to the complexity of the actual issues that contributed to the making of British official policy towards the American Civil War. On the "cotton" issue on which Chris sets so much store: Maldwyn Jones (*The Limits of Liberty: American History 1607-1992*) writes: "Thanks to heavy imports in the previous two years British manufacturers held large stocks of cotton when the war broke out; shortages of raw material did not become acute until 1863, by which time alternative supplies were beginning to arrive from India and Egypt." (p. 231) Similarly Adams: "There was no immediate shortage of supply [of cotton] when war came in America, rather an unusual accumulation of raw stocks…" (p. 333) In response to a French suggestion [in 1863] that Britain together with France break the blockade, Adams writes that Lord Lyons, the British Minister to the United States, "acknowledged the general pressure for cotton, but thought there was no need of great alarm as yet and also advanced the idea that in the end Europe would benefit by being forced to develop other sources of supply, thus being freed from such exclusive dependence on the United States." (p. 204) Maldwyn Jones again: "At the outset the South confidently expected that Great Britain in particular would be forced by her dependence on Southern cotton to intervene and break the blockade… But Southern faith in King Cotton was misplaced… […] Economic factors do not, however, explain why in the end neither Great Britain nor France was prepared to intervene [and break the Northern blockade]" (p. 231) Here is an account showing that the Confederacy's two attempts to persuade the British Government to depart from its policy of neutrality were failures: http://tinyurl.com/355wlp2 And more generally: "…All kinds of journals [in Britain] expressed differing views, regardless of their size and circulation. But the general sentiment backed a British neutrality that in reality favored the North." (In Robert L. Beisner, *American Foreign Relations Since 1600: A Guide to the Literature.Vol. 1*, p. 393 note 8: 397) http://tinyurl.com/ Allen Esterson Former lecturer, Science Department Southwark College, London allenester...@compuserve.com http://www.esterson.org --------------------------------------- Re: [tips] Canada's early intolerance Christopher D. Green Tue, 16 Nov 2010 14:03:01 -0800 Allen Esterson wrote: > Chris Green writes: > >> Indeed, if you recall your American history class, you >> may remember that as long as the Civil War was officially >> about "union," the British sided with the South (for the cotton) >> > > That you may recall this doesn't make it true. Britain was neutral > throughout the Civil War, and certainly didn't "side with the South" > during any part of it. "Sided with" was indeed too strong. It is true that Britain was officially neutral, but they were, shall we say, sympathetic to the South (entirely on grounds of self-interest -- an independent Confederacy would be a very weak country, very much dependent on the British appetite for "CSA" cotton. The remaining USA would be weakened too, to the benefit of Britain). Britain was involved in a number of disputed actions during the war (running blockades, making warships, etc.), each of which "just happened" to favor the Confederacy. US diplomacy throughout the early part of the war was aimed at heading off official British recognition of the CSA, which the British gov't was ever alert for an opportunity to offer. The Emancipation Proclamation served, among other things, to take that option off the table for the duration. Chris -- Christopher D. Green Department of Psychology York University Toronto, ON M3J 1P3 Canada --- You are currently subscribed to tips as: arch...@jab.org. 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