I don't have the time to read another of Allen essays, but skimming 
through it, I am surprised that there is not mention of the fact that 
Britain eventually (1872) did agree to pay damages to the US in the 
amount of $15,500,000 (about $275 billion today) in no small part for 
their actions during the Civil War (though, admitted no guilt).

Chris
-- 

Christopher D. Green
Department of Psychology
York University
Toronto, ON M3J 1P3
Canada

 

416-736-2100 ex. 66164
[email protected]
http://www.yorku.ca/christo/

==========================




Allen Esterson wrote:
> Chris Green writes:
>   
>> "Sided with" was indeed too strong. It is true that Britain was 
>>     
> officially
>   
>> neutral, but they were, shall we say, sympathetic to the South
>> (entirely on grounds of self-interest -- an independent Confederacy
>> would be a very weak country, very much dependent on the British
>> appetite for "CSA" cotton. The remaining USA would be weakened
>> too, to the benefit of Britain). Britain was involved in a number of
>> disputed actions during the war (running blockades, making warships,
>> etc.), each of which "just happened" to favor the Confederacy.[…]
>>     
>
> This, I gather, is in line with received American views on the British 
> position on the American Civil war. But is it accurate? In *Great 
> Britain and the American Civil War* (2006) (cited in my previous post) 
> Ephraim Douglas Adams quotes the British historian, George Grote 
> writing: 'The perfect neutrality of [Great Britain] in this destructive 
> war appears to me almost a phenomenon in political history'."
>
> Adams goes on to say that this is not the view prevalent in America, 
> and that the question his book sets out to answer is "Did Great Britain 
> in spite of her long years of championship of personal freedom and of 
> leadership in the cause of anti-slavery seize upon the disruption 
> offered in the destruction of the American Union… [and] react only to 
> selfish motives of commercial advantage and national power?" (p. 18)  
> His conclusion from a detailed analysis of the historical evidence is 
> very different from Chris's.
>
> Chris mentions "making warships", something I already dealt with in my 
> previous post, showing that an examination of the actual events does 
> not support Chris's interpretation of British Government support for 
> the South. It is certainly not the case that Britain (by which I 
> presume he means the British government) was "sympathetic to the South" 
> – as I already pointed out, the notion that British policy was largely 
> predicated on commercial self-interest (Chris: "the British appetite 
> for 'CSA' cotton") is simplistic and does not tally with close 
> examination of the policies and motivations of the British government 
> as discussed in great detail in Adams's book.
>
> Chris write of Britain's "running blockades". On the contrary, Britain 
> accepted the Northern blockade of the South, and any British ships that 
> ran the blockade were not sanctioned, either officially or 
> unofficially, by the British government.
>
> So let's look at the historical information in Adams's book in the 
> light of Chris's contentions.
>
> Did Britain wish for the success of the South in the Civil War?
>
> "In the months preceding the outbreak of the Civil War all British 
> governmental effort was directed toward keeping clear of the quarrel 
> and toward conciliation of the two sections… as the war dragged on, the 
> ministry, pressed from various angles at home, ventured, with much 
> uncertainty, upon a movement looking toward conciliation." (p. 605)
>
> Did the British Government "run" the blockade of the South (or 
> unofficially sanction such running of the blockade)?
>
> Adams writes, first quoting Lord Russell [British Prime Minister]: 
> "'His Majesty's Government are of the opinion, assuming the blockade is 
> duly notified [etc, etc,], …the fact that various ships may have 
> successfully escaped through it will not of itself prevent the blockade 
>  from being an effective one in international law.'  From this view 
> Russell never departed in official instructions. England's position as 
> the leading Maritime power made it inevitable that she should 
> immediately approve the American blockade effort and be cautious in 
> criticizing its legitimate operation. Both her own history, and 
> probable future interests, required such a policy far more important in 
> the eyes of  statesmen than any temporary injury to British commerce." 
> (p. 273)
>
> (That doesn't mean that English merchants would not (and did not) 
> attempt to break the blockade, but it was not the policy of the British 
> government that they should do so.)
>
> In February 1862, Adams writes, Prime Minister Russell "gave challenge 
> to pro-Southern sentiment by asserting the effectiveness of the 
> blockade, a challenge almost immediately made known to Parliament by 
> the presentation of papers." In response to a motion in Parliament by 
> sympathisers of the South who argued that the blockade was ineffective, 
> a supporter of Government policy, W.E. Forster, "showed that nearly all 
> the alleged blockade runners were in reality small coasting steamers, 
> which, by use of shallow inner channels, could creep along the shore 
> and then make a dash for the West Indies… To raise the blockade, he 
> argued, would be a direct violation by Britain of her neutrality." (p. 
> 278)
>
> Adams later raises an issue he says is "vital" to British home 
> politics, "one the ran like a constant thread through the whole pattern 
> of British attitude toward America.. This was the question of the 
> future of democracy. Was its fate bound up with the future of [the 
> Civil War]? And if so where lay British interest?" (p. 607)
>
> This aspect of British policy and public concerns is so important that 
> Adams devotes his last chapter to it. Even in the truncated form on 
> Google Books it is worth looking through as it illustrates again that 
> to view British government policy through the lens of commercial 
> interests does not do justice to the complexity of the actual issues 
> that contributed to the making of British official policy towards the 
> American Civil War.
>
> On the "cotton" issue on which Chris sets so much store:
>
> Maldwyn Jones (*The Limits of Liberty: American History 1607-1992*) 
> writes: "Thanks to heavy imports in the previous two years British 
> manufacturers held large stocks of cotton when the war broke out; 
> shortages of raw material did not become acute until 1863, by which 
> time alternative supplies were beginning to arrive from India and 
> Egypt." (p. 231) Similarly Adams: "There was no immediate shortage of 
> supply [of cotton] when war came in America, rather an unusual 
> accumulation of raw stocks…" (p. 333)
>
> In response to a French suggestion [in 1863] that Britain together with 
> France break the blockade, Adams writes that Lord Lyons, the British 
> Minister to the United States, "acknowledged the general pressure for 
> cotton, but thought there was no need of great alarm as yet and also 
> advanced the idea that in the end Europe would benefit by being forced 
> to develop other sources of supply, thus being freed from such 
> exclusive dependence on the United States." (p. 204)
>
> Maldwyn Jones again: "At the outset the South confidently expected that 
> Great Britain in particular would be forced by her dependence on 
> Southern cotton to intervene and break the blockade… But Southern faith 
> in King Cotton was misplaced… […] Economic factors do not, however, 
> explain why in the end neither Great Britain nor France was prepared to 
> intervene [and break the Northern blockade]" (p. 231)
>
> Here is an account showing that the Confederacy's two attempts to 
> persuade the British Government to depart from its policy of neutrality 
> were failures:
> http://tinyurl.com/355wlp2
>
> And more generally: "…All kinds of journals [in Britain] expressed 
> differing views, regardless of their size and circulation. But the 
> general sentiment backed a British neutrality that in reality favored 
> the North." (In Robert L. Beisner, *American Foreign Relations Since 
> 1600: A Guide to the Literature.Vol. 1*, p. 393 note 8: 397)
> http://tinyurl.com/
>
> Allen Esterson
> Former lecturer, Science Department
> Southwark College, London
> [email protected]
> http://www.esterson.org
>
> ---------------------------------------
>
> Re: [tips] Canada's early intolerance
> Christopher D. Green
> Tue, 16 Nov 2010 14:03:01 -0800
> Allen Esterson wrote:
>   
>> Chris Green writes:
>>
>>     
>>> Indeed, if you recall your American history class, you
>>> may remember that as long as the Civil War was officially
>>> about "union," the British sided with the South (for the cotton)
>>>
>>>       
>> That you may recall this doesn't make it true. Britain was neutral
>> throughout the Civil War, and certainly didn't "side with the South"
>> during any part of it.
>>     
>
> "Sided with" was indeed too strong. It is true that Britain was
> officially neutral, but they were, shall we say, sympathetic to the
> South (entirely on grounds of self-interest -- an independent
> Confederacy would be a very weak country, very much dependent on the
> British appetite for "CSA" cotton. The remaining USA would be weakened
> too, to the benefit of Britain). Britain was involved in a number of
> disputed actions during the war (running blockades, making warships,
> etc.), each of which "just happened" to favor the Confederacy. US
> diplomacy throughout the early part of the war was aimed at heading off
> official British recognition of the CSA, which the British gov't was
> ever alert for an opportunity to offer. The Emancipation Proclamation
> served, among other things, to take that option off the table for the
> duration.
>
> Chris
> --
>
> Christopher D. Green
> Department of Psychology
> York University
> Toronto, ON M3J 1P3
> Canada
>
>
>
>
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