On Sat, 4 Dec 2010 19:00:24 -0500, Christopher Green wrote:
> Mike,
>
> Since I don't subscribe to any of the views you have erroneously
>ascribed to me, I'm not much inclined to debate the matter with you.
*rolls eyes* Chris, I asked you to explain yourself about the
"psychology believing its own press" comment and to indicate
what you were saying relative to psychology as well as other
sciences. Did you?
No.
As in the past, you have evaded issues and have tried to escape
into vagaries. You post a silly Youtube video in an act of
regression to authority about how "social science" is, in Feynman's
questionable opinion, not a science ("organic farming"? WTF?).
I replied by identifying psychologists who's contribution to
science has earned them recognition by the National Academy
of Sciences -- ask your college's upper administration about how
prestegeous it is to have someone on the faculty who is in the
NAS. What do I need to do next? Count off the psychologists
who have Nobel prizes? What kind of game are you playing?
So, Chris, explain yourself. Do you or don't you view psychology
as a science. Please do not be evasive or vague. Be specific.
Oh, by the way, what are the assertions I made about you that
are erroneous? I don't see them below. Can you identify the
specific comments and avoid being vague and evasive?
>On the issues of definition in science, see Carl Hempel.
I would see Carl Hempel but he died in 1997. This kind of statement
is similar to "for a definition of language, see Noam Chomsky" without
acknowledging that Chomsky has had about 5-6 different theories
since he first presented the standard theory. What exactly are you
referring to? Perhaps you can identify it in the Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy entry on Hempel; see:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hempel/
Does it involve black ravens and white shoes (i.e., the problem of modus
tollens validating all law-like statements, the paradox of confirmation?).
Lastly, because I am a nice guy, why don't you just point out which of
Hempel's writings one should read in order to understand what you're
talking about if you're not going to tell us. I provide a list of writings
below. Interested reader should look at the SEP entry for problems
and extensions of Hempel's thinking.
Have a good Sunday.
-Mike Palij
New York University
[email protected]
1942, "The Function of General Laws in History," Journal of Philosophy, 39:
35-48.
1945a, "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation", Mind, 54: 1-26 and 97-121.
1945b, "Geometry and Empirical Science", American Mathematical Monthly, 52:
7-17.
1945c, "On the Nature of Mathematical Truth", American Mathematical Monthly,
52: 543-556.
1950, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning" Revue
Internationale de Philosophie, 41(11): 41-63.
1951, "The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration," Proceedings
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 80(1): 61-77.
1952, Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
1958, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, Vol. II, H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell (eds.), Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, pp. 37-98.
1960, "Inductive Inconsistencies," Synthese, 12: 439-469.
1962a, "Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation", in Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III, H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.),
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 98-169.
1962b, "Explanation in Science and in History", in Frontiers of Science and
Philosophy, R. G. Colodney (ed.), Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh
Press, pp. 9-33.
1962c, "Rational Action", Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association, 35: 5-23.
1965a, "Postscript (1964)", in Hempel 1965d: 47-51.
1965b, "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes",
in Hempel 1965d: 101-119.
1965c, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," in Hempel 1965d: 331-496.
1965d, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York, NY: Free Press.
1966a, Philosophy of Natural Science, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
1966b, "Recent Problems of Induction", in R. G. Colodny (ed.), Mind and Cosmos,
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 112-134.
1968, "Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation",
Philosophy of Science, 35 (June): 116-133.
1970, "On the 'Standard Conception' of Scientific Theories", in M. Radner and
S. Winokur (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. IV,
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 142-163.
1979, "Scientific Rationality: Analytic vs. Pragmatic Perspectives", in T. S.
Geraets (ed.), Rationality To-Day, Ottawa, Canada: The University of Ottowa
Press,46-58.
1981, "Turns in the Evolution of the Problem of Induction", Synthese, 46:
193-404.
1983, "Valuation and Objectivity in Science," in Physics, Philosophy, and
Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grunbaum, Robert S. Cohen and Larry
Laudan (eds.), Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 73-100.
1988a, "Limits of a Deductive Construal of the Function of Scientific
Theories", in E. Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), Science in Reflection. The Israeli
Colloquium, (Volume 3), Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1-15.
1988b, "Provisos: A Problem Concerning the Inferential Function of Scientific
Theories", Erkenntnis, 28: 147-164.
Hempel, C. G. and P. Oppenheim, 1945d, "A Definition of 'Degree of
Confirmation'", Philosophy of Science, 12: 98-115.
--- 1948, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," Philosophy of Science, 15:
135-175.
> On Dec 4, 2010, at 3:22 PM, "Mike Palij" <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> On Sat, 04 Dec 2010 10:15:22 -0800, Christopher D. Green wrote:
>>> Honestly, Mike. Are you this pedantic, humorless, and self-important in
>>> real life, or only on the TIPS list?
>>
>> No. I'm *more* pedantic, etc. You should read me on the
>> Psychteacher list! :-)
>>
>> See, I run rings around you logically! (10 points for source).
>>
>>> Just a touch of humility would probably do wonders for psychology's
>>> reputation, instead of the brittle, paranoid defensiveness that is
>>> all-too-commonly its public face.
>>
>> So, does this mean you're not going to provide a definition for science,
>> just like I couldn't get a definition of "learning" out of you a while back?
>>
>> *sigh* Let me see, either your remark is in support of Prof Smith
>> comments (that psychology's claim to be a science appears to be
>> undeserved, that is has does not have the same status of discipline
>> as physics, chemistry, biology, etc.,) and that psychology's claims to
>> be a science is just an example of its belief in its own press/hype, or
>> your comments are a non sequitur.
>>
>> So which is it?
>>
>> -Mike Palij
>> New York University
>> [email protected]
>>
>>
>> P.S. Oh, intercourse the penguin! ;-)
>>
>> ==========================
>>
>>
>> Mike Palij wrote:
>>> On Fri, 03 Dec 2010 18:21:25 -0800, Christopher Green wrote:
>>>
>>>> In show business, this is referred to as the problem of believing one's
>>>> own
>>>> press.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Please explain yourself. It would help if you provided a definition for
>>> science and then identify how all activities covered by psychology
>>> fail to meet that definition (I'm particularly interested in why you
>>> don't think cognitive neuropsychology, mathematical psychology,
>>> and psychophysics fail to meet basic criteria for being a science).
>>> If you please, you can also identify/explain what areas of the
>>> traditional sciences (i.e., physics, chemistry, biology, etc.) fail to
>>> your critieria.
>>>
---
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