Hiya, On 07/11/17 23:53, Nancy Cam-Winget (ncamwing) wrote: > Hi Stephen, Adding to Flemming’s comment, finding “exact quotes” > will be difficult
I'm sorry but when making a claim that such and such a regulation *requires* breaking TLS then you really do need to be that precise. > as their intent is really not to break things but > rather want to ensure that inspection and oversight is available to > affect guards/protections within an (enterprise/data center) > infrastructure. That said, PCI and other regulations will have a > lot of documents that one has to go through….one that kind-of calls > explicitly to the use of packet inspection, firewalling and such is > in: > > https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/SAQ_D_v3_Merchant.pdf The first mention of TLS there talks about protecting administrator passwords via TLS. That totally argues against deployment of any kind of MitM infrastructure. > > It is an assessment questionnaire for vendors to evaluate their > compliance, the requirements speak to securing the network and > systems including firewalls, DMZs and the ability to do packet > inspection. Please point me at the specific text. Given you added PCI-DSS to your document I would assume you did the work already. If not, that's a bit odd. S. > > Thanks, Nancy > > On 11/7/17, 3:27 PM, "Flemming Andreasen (fandreas)" > <fandr...@cisco.com> wrote: > > Thanks for taking an initial look at the document Stephen - please > see below for responses so far > > On 11/7/17 4:13 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: >> Hiya, >> >> On 07/11/17 02:48, Flemming Andreasen wrote: >>> We didn't draw any particular line, but the use case scenarios >>> that we tried to highlight are those related to overall security >>> and regulatory requirements (including public sector) >> I had a quick look at the draft (will try read properly en-route >> to ietf-100) and I followed the reference to [1] but that only lead >> to a forest of documents in which I didn't find any reference to >> breaking TLS so far at least. Can you provide an explicit pointer >> to the exact document on which that claim is based? > For NERC, you can look under "(CIP) Critital Infrastructure > Protection". CIP-005-5 for example covers the electronic security > perimeter, which has a couple of relevant requirements and associated > text: > > http://www.nerc.com/_layouts/PrintStandard.aspx?standardnumber=CIP-005-5&title=Cyber%20Security%20-%20Electronic%20Security%20Perimeter(s)&jurisdiction=United%20States > > > > To be clear though, the document does not specifically call out > breaking TLS, but it does clearly call out the need to detect > malicious inbound and outbound communications by leveraging an > "Electronic Access Point" (e.g. IDS/IPS) to enforce the Electronic > Security Perimeter. >> I'd also claim that your reference to PCI-DSS is misleading, as >> that same spec also explicitly calls for there to be good key >> management specifically including minimising the number of copies >> of keys, so at most, one might be able to claim that PCI-DSS is ok >> with people who break TLS in a nod-and-a-wink manner. But if you do >> have a real quote from PCI-DSS that calls for breaking TLS then >> please do also send that (it's been asked for a bunch of times >> without any answer being provided so far). > > I will need to look more closely for such a quote - if anybody else > knows of one, please chime in as well. > > Thanks > > -- Flemming > > >> Thanks, S. >> >> >> [1] >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-camwinget-tls-use-cases-00.html#ref-NERCCIP > >> > > > >
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