+1 !
Well stated.

From: TLS [mailto:tls-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of nalini elkins
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2018 11:59 AM
To: Colm MacCárthaigh <c...@allcosts.net>
Cc: <tls@ietf.org> <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS@IETF101 Agenda Posted

Stephen (and TLS group)

We need to look at the bigger picture.

The TLS working group has been concentrating on making the Internet secure for 
the individual user.    We feel that there is also an underlying motivation to 
help the underdog and protect the political dissident.  These are all laudable 

But, the Internet is much more than that.  The Internet is the underpinnings of 
much of the business community which is utilized by consumers (end users).   
Making a change which makes businesses less secure because crucial functions 
cannot be done will lead to enormous chaos and disruption.   Many businesses 
are likely to not want to adopt TLS1.3 or seek unique DIY type alternatives.  
In fact, we have already heard of some planning to block TLS 1.3 traffic just 
for this reason.  So, the main thing to acknowledge is that the enterprise use 
case is different than the Internet use case.  As such, it needs its own 
solution.  Please note that the endpoint is the intended recipient of the 
session and the owner and responsible party for the security of the data.

The presentation in London is to present a use case solution – along with TLS 
WG recommendations/updates from Prague where half of the room hummed that an 
internal solution is needed.

This rift is not good for the TLS Working Group, it is not good for the IETF, 
it is not good for the business community and it is not good for the Internet.  
We need to have some type of methodology so that we can continue to protect 
ourselves.  Therefore, we are asking for WG help with a solution to the 
enterprise use case.

This ID helps explain the situation and subsequent need.  If you haven’t had a 
chance to read it yet, please try to do it before the London meeting.

Nalini Elkins
Enterprise Data Center Operators

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 8:06 AM, Colm MacCárthaigh 
<c...@allcosts.net<mailto:c...@allcosts.net>> wrote:

It's my fault for the ambiguous wording, but in this context the quote from me 
reads as the opposite of my intent.  To be more clear: what I meant was that 
while the proposals aren't making much progress, I don't mind that it's being 

I'm happy to have mailing list threads on the topic and agenda time devoted to 
it (I don't go in person, but I do watch the videos). Since it's an area of 
such disagreement, I'd prefer to see /more/ discussion, not less. There's 
always hope of movement and progress on either side, and I think good discourse 
lessens the risk of dozens of fragmentary DIY solutions, which I think will be 
the worst kind of outcome of non-engagement.

On Tue, Mar 13, 2018 at 10:21 AM, Stephen Farrell 
<stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie<mailto:stephen.farr...@cs.tcd.ie>> wrote:


Just to be clear: I'm still waiting for the chairs and/or
AD to explain how the proposed discussion of this draft
is consistent with IETF processes, given the results of
the discussion in Prague (a very clear lack of consensus
to even work on this topic), and the discussion of the
-00 version of this late last year. IOW, I don't consider
my objection has been answered.

In case people haven't got all the mails from last year
at the front of their minds, I went through them for you
and have provided links and selected quotes below. Yes,
the quotes are selected but I think do indicate that the
opposition to these ideas is as before. And there were
also the usual voices in support of weakening TLS in this
manner as well - a read of the thread clearly indicates
to me that discussion of this draft in London will, as
before, be a divisive waste of time and energy.

Chairs: Please drop the agenda item, or explain how any
of this fits our process, because I'm just not getting


me, "IMO the WG shouldn't touch this terrible proposal with a


Randy Bush: "there are a lot of us lurkers out here a bit horrified
watching this wg go off the rails." (Different thread, but same topic)


Uri Blumenthal: "+1 to Stephen"


Rich Salz: "put this on hold for a year or two after TLS 1.3 is done"


Ion Larranaga Azcue, "I really don't feel confortable with the approach
taken in this draft."


Hubert Kario: "to be clear: me too" (replying about hating the idea)


Rich Salz: "I am opposed to the basic concept of injecting a third-party
into the E2E TLS process."


Florian Weimer: "I don't understand why this complicated approach is


Ben Kaduk: "I do not see any potential for a workable solution."


Uri Blumenthal: "why do we spend time discussing this draft?"


Christian Huitema: "Maybe they have found ways to manage their
applications and servers without breaking TLS..."


Ted Lemon: "I think we should stop."


Andrei Popov: "deploying a weakened configuration of TLS 1.3 (without
PFS) would not meet the intent of those future mandates/requirements."
(On "industry need")


Ben Kaduk: "The time I am spending on this thread is time that I am not
able to spend improving the TLS 1.3 document."


Dave Garrett: "Please, let's just let this mess die. "


Uri Blumenthal "I'm against weakening the protocol, since there are
other ways to accomplish the perlustrator's mission"

        Yeah, I had to look it up too:-)

Adam Caudill: "To be honest, I’m rather surprised that this group
continues to spend time on this."


Tony Arcieri, "Having worked (and presently working) for more than one
company of this nature, in the payments business no less, I would like
to restate that it's incredibly disingenuous to cite the need for
self-MitM capability as an "industry" concern."


Colm MacCárthaigh: "I don't have too strong an interest in this thread,
it's not going anywhere, and I don't mind that."


Peter Saint-Andre: "+1 to Stephen's request." (for chairs to close down
the discussion)


Cas Cremers: " I think such a mechanism should not be part of the TLS
1.3 standard."


Karthikeyan Bhargavan: "I really don’t recommend any change to the TLS
1.3 design to accomplish any of this"


TLS mailing list


TLS mailing list

Nalini Elkins
Enterprise Data Center Operators

The information contained in this communication is highly confidential and is 
intended solely for the use of the individual(s) to whom this communication is 
directed. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that 
any viewing, copying, disclosure or distribution of this information is 
prohibited. Please notify the sender, by electronic mail or telephone, of any 
unintended receipt and delete the original message without making any copies.
 Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Blue Care Network of Michigan are 
nonprofit corporations and independent licensees of the Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield Association.
TLS mailing list

Reply via email to