I reviewed this draft (“browsed through” would be a more honest statement). I didn’t spot an obvious problem with it.
One question that I have after reading it: I understand why one wants to implement this extension, but I don’t see how the two endpoints would arrive at that external PSK. From: TLS <[email protected]> on behalf of Russ Housley <[email protected]> Date: Monday, May 20, 2019 at 3:21 PM To: Joe Salowey <[email protected]> Cc: IETF TLS <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an External PSK ensures the US Government has a quantum-resistant option for TLS in the interim years until post-quantum algorithms emerge from the NIST process. For this reason, there is an intent to specify this extension in future procurements. Russ On May 15, 2019, at 9:20 AM, Joseph Salowey <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: The last call has come and gone without any comment. Please indicate if you have reviewed the draft even if you do not have issues to raise so the chairs can see who has reviewed it. Also indicate if you have any plans to implement the draft. On Tue, Apr 9, 2019 at 8:51 PM Joseph Salowey <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: This is the working group last call for the "TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an External Pre-Shared Key” draft available at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk/. Please review the document and send your comments to the list by 2359 UTC on 23 April 2019. Thanks, Chris, Joe, and Sean
_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
