All, I am against publication of the document through the TLS WG.
My reasons were explained earlier, e.g. in [1], and have not been addressed in later versions of the document. If this document is published (e.g., through the ISE or AD-sponsored, which seems more appropriate for political crypto), consider adding warnings about the risks of using non-hybrids and lattices. /Simon [1] https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg23297.html Joseph Salowey via Datatracker <[email protected]> writes: > This message initiates a new Working Group Last Call for > draft-ietf-tls-mlkem[1], which defines standalone ML-KEM key > establishment for TLS 1.3. The main question before the working group > is: "Should the working group publish a document specifying stand > alone ML-KEM?". If there is rough consensus then we will push to > refine and publish the document; otherwise, we will stop discussing > the draft and not progress it. Please respond to this call indicating > whether you support publishing a document specifying a stand alone > ML-KEM. Please refrain from further discussion on this topic as most > arguments have been discussed multiple times. > > Why are we holding this consensus call now? > > Significant developments have occurred both within this document and > in the broader TLS ecosystem to address the concerns raised in the > last WGLC. Therefore, the third consensus call is warranted. We ask > the working group to consider document publication in light of these > recent changes: > > - Promotion of Hybrids in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem: Following a > separate consensus call, the WG agreed to promote the X25519MLKEM768 > hybrid group to Recommended: Y in the IANA registry. Consequently, the > IANA registry will reflect a clear community preference for a hybrid > because Recommended: Y clearly indicates this while the standalone > ML-KEM groups defined in this draft remain Recommended: N. The updated > security considerations in [1] reference the IANA registry to > emphasize this preference. > > - Key Share Reuse Prohibited in draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis: The WG > recently reached consensus to explicitly prohibit key share reuse > across connections in TLS 1.3. The new text changes the guidance from > SHOULD NOT to a strict MUST NOT. This resolves the concerns regarding > static key reuse and its associated privacy and forward-secrecy risks > for ML-KEM. > > - Nadim updated the ProVerif model of TLS 1.3 to evaluate KEM and > hybrid KEM groups in TLS 1.3. This supports other results which show > that KEMs are secure when used in TLS 1.3 and that hybrid groups are > secure even if one of the components is compromised. > > - Liaisons: We received liaison statements from multiple SDOs > including O-RAN[2], IEEE 802.11[4] and from 3GPP[3] expressing support > for the publication of draft-ietf-tls-mlkem as an RFC as they rely on > the IETF to provide a stable normative reference. > > Please note that a third-party IPR disclosure exists [5] against this > document regarding patents related to the underlying ML-KEM > algorithm. This IPR declaration has not changed since the last > WGLC. As a reminder, per BCP 79, the IETF takes no stance on the > validity of patent claims, and the working group may decide to proceed > with a technology despite IPR disclosures if it decides that such use > is warranted. > > Conduct Reminder: Given the heated nature of previous discussions on > this topic, participants are strongly reminded to adhere to the IETF > Code of Conduct (BCP 54) and the TLS WG's Mail List Procedures. Keep > feedback professional, technical, and focused on the document's text. > > This working group last call will end on 2026-07-08. > > Joe and Sean > > [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-mlkem/ > [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/2198/ > [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/2151/ > [4] https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/2148/ > [5] > https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?submit=draft&id=draft-ietf-tls-mlkem > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
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