I do not support the publication of this document as it seems to me that the implementations "in the field" need a currently secure baseline as a mandatory border.
A more baseline-mandatory approach with an optional component seems more reasonable to me. Kind regards Justin Am 30. Juni 2026 18:51:52 MESZ schrieb Roland Shoemaker <[email protected]>: >I support publication. Those who want to use the already specified hybrid >can use it; those who want to use pure ML-KEM, can use the pure variant. >Nobody is forcing anyone to use either, and there are good arguments for >both. > >On Tue, Jun 30, 2026 at 9:22 AM Ludovic Perret <[email protected]> >wrote: > >> Similarly, I oppose the publication; the reasons have already been >> explained and debated. >> >> Ludovic Perret >> >> EPITA/Sorbonne University >> >> >> ------ Original Message ------ >> From "Adam Firestone" <[email protected]> >> To "[email protected]" <[email protected]> >> Date 30/06/2026 12:15:35 >> Subject [TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends >> 2026-07-08) >> >> >[Vous ne recevez pas souvent de courriers de [email protected]. Découvrez >> pourquoi ceci est important à >> https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification ] >> > >> >I oppose the publication of this document for reasons already ably stated. >> > >> >Many thanks, >> > >> >Adam Firestone >> >SIX3RO, Inc. >> >_______________________________________________ >> >TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >> >To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list -- [email protected] >> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >>
_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
