----- Original Message -----
From: "Costin Manolache" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2003 8:52 PM
Subject: Re: 4.1 authentication bug / bug 14616


> I think it is reasonable to fix it.
>
> This can be serious - if someone relies on application isolation ( like
>  a hosting environment ), the consequences can be really bad, with
> one webapp guessing the credentials of another one.
> The fix seems reasonably simple and clean.
>

Except that it isn't really a fix.  Like Remy, I'd like to see a more
general fix (e.g. using the new 5.0 Mapper).  However, I won't -1 if Keith
wants to commit his patch.  It does fix the worst-case condition.

> Costin
>
> Keith Wannamaker wrote:
>
> > Greetings,
> >
> > I brought this up in November.  Remy and I have a disagreement
> > on how important fixing this bug is.  I want to see if there is
> > a quorum of other committers who understand the problem and think
> > it should be fixed prior to the next stable build release of 4.1.
> >
> > The immediate problem is that current Tomcat behavior causes
> > browsers to submit auth credentials to webapps other than the
> > webapp who originally sent the 401 challenge.
> >
> > Most web servers, like Apache, are careful to redirect for
> > trailing slashes before challenging for authentication.  Tomcat
> > does this backward.  The result is the client will usually cache
> > the need for auth for the entire domain and not just a single
> > webapp.
> >
> > Here is a repeat of the scenario I mentioned in November
> > <http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=tomcat-dev&m=103673355109222&w=2>
> >
> >  <Context path="/foo" docBase="foo" />
> >  <Context path="/bar" docBase="bar" />
> >
> > foo and bar web.xml protected with
> >     <security-constraint>
> >       <web-resource-collection>
> >         <web-resource-name>name </web-resource-name>
> >         <url-pattern>/*</url-pattern>
> >       </web-resource-collection>
> >       <auth-constraint>
> >         <role-name>admin</role-name>
> >       </auth-constraint>
> >     </security-constraint>
> >
> > Current behavior:
> > Request                 Response
> > GET /foo                401
> >  (at this point browsers will send credentials to any url in this
domain)
> > GET /foo with auth      301 redirect to /foo/
> > GET /foo/               200
> > GET /bar with auth
> >          ^^^^^^^^^
> >
> > Correct behavior:
> > GET /foo                301 redirect to /foo/
> > GET /foo/               401
> > GET /foo/ with auth     200
> > GET /bar without auth
> >          ^^^^^^^^^^^^
> >
> > My proposed patch is attached to bug 14616
> > <http://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14616>
> > While this does not cover the case of subdirectories within
> > a context, it does fix the most egregious case for context
> > roots.
> >
> > Please comment if you are not comfortable with credentials being
> > inadvertently shared between all webapps on a given domain.
> >
> > Keith
>
>
>
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