Roger, your suggestion to prefer “onion service” regardless of any client or server short-circuiting is in line with our suggestions. When server-short-circuiting becomes an actual thing, then Paul may argue that a different name is appropriate (depending on if it uses an onion address, as I understand him), but that depends on the specifics of the design.
As far as the “short-circuit” term itself, I personally think its cute and logical but a bit long (“server short-circuited onion service”?). Maybe you can think of a way to shorten it. In any case, I added it to the wiki [0]. My opinion is that no good recommendation can be made until there is a design, and the person that writes the design will probably get a big say in the name. I believe that Steven Murdoch has a student working on it… Best, Aaron [0] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/sponsors/SponsorR/Terminology > On Feb 10, 2015, at 2:11 PM, Paul Syverson <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 01:41:35PM -0500, Roger Dingledine wrote: >> On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 01:13:26PM -0500, A. Johnson wrote: >>> 1. '''onion service''' should be preferred to refer to what is now >>> called a "hidden service". If other flavors of onion services develop in >>> the future, this term could refer to all of them, with more specific terms >>> being used when it is necessary to make the distinction. >> >> I'm a fan. >> >>> 1. Some names for a setup in which the onion service location is known >>> but still must be connected to via the Tor protocol: >>> * '''Tor-required service''', '''TRS''' for short >>> * '''Direct onion service''', '''direct service''' for short >>> 2. Some names to specify that the onion service is hidden, if that >>> becomes necessary: >>> * '''Protected onion service''', '''protected service''' for >>> short >>> * '''Tor-protected service''', '''TPS''' for short >> >> You know how we call "a person who makes an anonymous Facebook account >> over Tor and uses it without ever identifying herself to Facebook" >> a Tor user? And how we also call "a person who logs into her 'real' >> Facebook account over Tor" a Tor user? > > Yes and? > >> >> I think for more onion service scenarios than we think, we should >> just call them onion services and not specify which components of the >> rendezvous process are short-circuited and which aren't. > > The idea of a TRS/direct-onion-service/etc as we have been discussing > it is a service where there is in all likelihood no rendezous (nor > introduction point) at all. It is just necessary to connect to it via > Tor. A naive way to implement this would be to have a server that only > accepts connections from Tor relays (OK we could even require only Tor > relays and only TLS). Presumably we want a somewhat smarter design > than that. I don't want to set out anything smarter here. My goal is > just to give the basic notion simply if not entirely accurately. The > point is that it is an open question (that would be foolish to answer > until the design and its use are more fully set out) whether we would > want to give these .onion addresses (or force them to have .onion > addresses to work with the protocol). And if they don't have (or only > optionally have) .onion addresses, then calling them onionsites seems > like a bad idea that can only foster confusion with the things that do > have .onion addresses. And to give them .onion addresses just so we > can apply the currently proposed terminology would be to do things > bass ackwards. > > The current terminological proposal works well for heretofor "Hidden > Services" and associated protocols and systems, even (and perhaps > especially) when used for other purposes than hiding IP address of the > service. What best to call these other future kinds of services at > this point is quite bikeshed IMO. > >> >> And for those situations where we're specifically talking about whether >> the rendezvous process is short-circuited on the client side and/or the >> service side... I wonder what people think of this 'short-circuited' >> term. (It is both an English idiom and also actually true.) > > Perhaps that will be good. Again I'd like to know what the design is > doing before I try to name it. > > aloha, > Paul > _______________________________________________ > tor-dev mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
