On Sun, May 21, 2017 at 10:37 AM, grarpamp <[email protected]> wrote: >> remember that they took the relay because >> a *victim* contacted it, not because they think the "guyz behind the >> software" did. > > Civil sue them for stupid thinking / false arrest confiscation, > loss of service and use, public tarnishment, bad training, etc. > >>> what can be interesting for police by unpluging those >>> guards relays ? > > Nothing. Well, off topic, unless they were researching confirmation > or partitioning attacks. > >> Typically that's why cops choose not to bother Tor relays -- because >> they know there will be nothing useful. >> That's actually why the torservers.net people suggest *not* using disk >> encryption. Having no barriers makes it much easier for the police to >> realize that there's nothing useful to them. > > This falling over may perhaps not be preferred by operators who like to > create wins in the crypto war. You want police to go get their warrants, > waste their time and money, just to prove nothing upon decrypt... > then you have higher recorded, thus marketable, percent of nothing > found among all forced decrypt cases. Instead of closer to 100% > of such cases just confirming already forgone criminal cases. > Having higher barriers and costs and demonstrably less fruit > ratio can make such seizures more unlikely in first place.
Can they force an operator to decrypt, if he lives in other country which is non-US and non-EU (e.g. Russia or China)? Does it make sense to run nodes in countries you don't live in or visit? What happens if an operator themselves is anonymous? -- Best regards, Boris Nagaev _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
