Hi all, has there been any discussion/research whether Tor bridges are more likely to get blacklisted in censored areas if they'd been first run as simple internal relays? The idea being, if a censorship system is fishing for Tor nodes so they can be blacklisted on a per-IP-address basis and an internal relay later on becomes a bridge but is using the same external IP address, I suppose it is possible that it might get automatically blacklisted. Say I'm a censor and I'm blacklisting all IPs found in the published consensuses. I discover that someone is trying to connect to an IP previously found on a consensus (and I recall all previous IPs) - I do not do DPI - and simply block the connection due to IP address match. In this case, it doesn't matter if the bridge could be found via bridgeDB, or if it's doing pluggable transports. Any known cases/reports where this is likely to have happened?
The reason I'm asking is, I've been running an internal Tor relay and am considering making it to be an obfsproxy bridge; it would be the same IP address. Perhaps this is inefficient, i.e. it is likely to have already been blacklisted in many censored/important areas? I suppose it's also an interesting question in itself, and it would be interesting to do some experiments e.g. using OONI. Thanks for any input Kostas. _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
