The network is pretty visible. China seems to actively be seeking out bridges anyway [1] (and I would assume that this applies to other oppressive countries as well). So if your bridge would otherwise be private, rolling up a TorCloud instance instead is a solid choice. If you're running it from your home network, maybe check to see if your IP address is the same as it was before (if possible)?
~Griffin [1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/foci12/how-great-firewall-china-blocking-tor On Mon, May 20, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Kostas Jakeliunas <[email protected]>wrote: > Hi all, > > has there been any discussion/research whether Tor bridges are more likely > to get blacklisted in censored areas if they'd been first run as simple > internal relays? The idea being, if a censorship system is fishing for Tor > nodes so they can be blacklisted on a per-IP-address basis and an internal > relay later on becomes a bridge but is using the same external IP address, > I suppose it is possible that it might get automatically blacklisted. Say > I'm a censor and I'm blacklisting all IPs found in the published > consensuses. I discover that someone is trying to connect to an IP > previously found on a consensus (and I recall all previous IPs) - I do not > do DPI - and simply block the connection due to IP address match. In this > case, it doesn't matter if the bridge could be found via bridgeDB, or if > it's doing pluggable transports. Any known cases/reports where this is > likely to have happened? > > The reason I'm asking is, I've been running an internal Tor relay and am > considering making it to be an obfsproxy bridge; it would be the same IP > address. Perhaps this is inefficient, i.e. it is likely to have already > been blacklisted in many censored/important areas? I suppose it's also an > interesting question in itself, and it would be interesting to do some > experiments e.g. using OONI. > > Thanks for any input > Kostas. > _______________________________________________ > tor-talk mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > -- Technical Program Associate, Open Technology Institute #Foucault / PGP: 0xAE792C97 / OTR: [email protected] _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list [email protected] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
