Hi, all: We've been banging away on the SCT encoding issue for a year, and we really must close it out. Paul and I have been doing due diligence on the issue in the background. We made a concerted effort to find technical problems with the current text that would exclude the possibility of allowing it in the -bis document. Here's what we found:
1) The proposed encoding does not violate the letter of any specification that we can find, 2) Peter Gutmann said that it's not a good idea but it isn't incorrect, 3) We checked with the authors of several widely-used pieces of certificate processing software and in every case that person said that the proposed encoding would not cause problems with their code, and 4) We verified that the IETF security ADs would not reject the encoding during IESG review Basically, in a nutshell, where we've landed is that while the current encoding probably isn't the best idea ever, it doesn't violate any specification that anybody could identify and it doesn't appear to break anything. So, it's going to stand. We will not be revisiting this issue unless new information is presented. This includes discussion at the upcoming meeting in Dallas. Thanks, Melinda and Paul _______________________________________________ Trans mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
