I just re-read large portions of the document, and I agree it should be published. It appears to be in excellent shape.
-Tim > -----Original Message----- > From: Trans <[email protected]> On Behalf Of Stephen Kent > Sent: Friday, August 3, 2018 2:44 PM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [Trans] The trans threat analysis document > > The chair's message is a mis-characterization of the history and status of > this > document. > > As the cognizant AD, Eric Rescorla discussed the document status with the > WG chairs early this year. Paul stated that that there were a two paragraphs > in > the version -12 text (in sections 3.4 and 3.5) that were sticking points for > David Cooper. A telecon was arranged and took place on April 12. The > participants were Paul, David, Eric, Richard Barnes (acting as secretary) > and > me. The outcome of that telecon was text, crafted by Richard, which was > agreed to by all parties. This text was incorporated into the next version > (-13) > of the document which was published later in April. > > I assumed that were were done, but I was wrong. After this version was > posted, David sent a large number (~29) of additional comments to the list. > Thus Paul's assertion that there were only two paragraph that need to be > changed to satisfy David was incorrect. > I made changes based on all but 6 or 7 of David's comments. Most of his > comments were straightforward and I agreed that the requested changes > were appropriate. I posted a message detailing the changes and the > rationale > for not making changes for the remaining few comments. A new version (-14) > was posted on May 29. I think the changes I made represent a good faith > effort to address David's legitimate issues, especially since all of the > telecon > participants believed that we had already done so in April. > > Ryan Sleevi and I began an exchange based on his comments, on version -14. > Ryan argued that some of the text did not represent the intent of CT, or the > practice of CT implementations, based on his experience as a developer. I > countered that the analysis is based on 6962-bis, and if that text was not > consistent with intent and practice, from his perspective, then the document > should change. We agreed to table our discussion pending relevant changes to > 6962-bis. > > I believe there have been no changes to 6269-bis that are relevant to the > points Ryan and I discussed, and thus no new version of the threat analysis > is > merited. > > Steve > > > Hi, all: > > > > Paul and I discussed the status of the threat document and > > agree that it is not appropriate for chairs to make changes > > to the content of working group documents in the absence of > > working group consensus. We've been deadlocked on the > > threat analysis document for several years now, and while > > we would very much like for the parties who disagree to > > find a compromise, and for the document to be published, it > > does not weaken the protocol document if it is not. So, if > > the authors and those who have issues with the current text > > cannot find some compromise text before the working group > > shuts down, the document will not be published as a working > > group document. The authors, of course, are free to > > pursue publication through alternative processes should they > > continue to be unable to arrive at a compromise. > > > > Melinda > > _______________________________________________ > Trans mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/trans
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