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President Museveni's decision to close KFM radio station on
August 11 because of my radio show of the previous day and throw
me in jail came exactly as expected.
Strategically, this is a sign of political weakness not
strength. This strategy is not new. After the 2001 presidential
elections, Mr Museveni meted out unmitigated harassment against
his opponent Kizza Besigye and wife Winnie Byanyima leading to
their escape from the country. I wrote a three-part article in
Sunday Monitor in October 2001 arguing that this harassment was
not aimed at Dr Besigye and Ms Byanyima although they were the
victims of it. Rather Museveni was using it to demonstrate to
other historical pillars of the NRM the costs of taking Besigye's
path. In colonial parlance, this was called "gunboat diplomacy".
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| TACTICAL MANOEUVRES: Gen. Museveni.
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As with Besigye and Byanyima, the President did not aim at KFM
or Monitor Publications Limited. His target goes beyond the media
and independent private enterprises to threaten freedom of
_expression_ generally. Much more broadly, the target of Museveni in
this action is the wider Ugandan society, which he wants to subdue
on his path to consolidate a one-man totalitarian regime. Over the
last 20 years, Museveni has sustained his strategy of neutralising
and destroying every organisation or institution that stands
independent of him.
Background
In 1986 when he was politically weak, he consolidated his
position through an inclusive strategy that brought other
political parties, especially the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC)
and the Democratic Party (DP) into a broad-based government. But
this was only a tactical manoeuvre to win a strategic objective
consolidating his power. Museveni then used the "gentleman's
agreement" with these parties to keep them in a cooler while using
resistance councils to consolidate the NRM at the grassroots.
By 1994, the parties had been weakened by co-optation, legal
restrictions and eight years of hate propaganda to suffer a
resounding defeat in the Constituent Assembly elections, a defeat
that was consolidated by the 1996 presidential and parliamentary
elections.
However, Museveni's strategy of political consolidation was
heavily reliant on financial aid from international creditors.
This made it difficult for him to consolidate one party rule in
the post-Cold War world unless he demonstrated some commitment to
democratic values, hence press freedom, some judicial independence
and other democratic safeguards under the 1995 Constitution.
Museveni also exploited donor-sponsored economic reforms to
destroy other forms of civic organisation independent of him such
as trade unions and co-operatives. In their wake, what emerged was
a "civil society" dominated by foreign aid-funded local and
international NGOs who except for a few are merely vehicles of
income for their employees than representatives of a vibrant civic
life.
Although the Sixth Parliament was actually a one-party
Parliament dominated by NRM members, it sought to impose checks on
how Museveni managed (or should we say mismanaged) state affairs.
By weakening external opposition to him in form of DP and UPC,
Museveni had inadvertently allowed submerged tensions within NRM
to take centre stage. As a result, a new opposition now formed
around the moderate and progressive wing within the NRM itself
against its more extremist and anti-democratic elements. The
progressives inside the NRM united with the opposition in the old
political parties around the Young Parliamentarians Association
and formed a vibrant political force.
The new opposition
As battles raged between the two sides, Museveni sought to
remove this alternative platform taking shape inside the NRM but
more reflected in the institution of Parliament. Between 1998 and
2003, he progressively weakened the moderate, enlightened and
pro-democratic faction of the NRM, while at the same time
neutralising Parliament as an institution.
The period 2003-2005 has been instructive as Museveni was able
to realise this vision. Mr Eriya Kategaya, his childhood friend
and deputy prime minister, and other former Cabinet ministers such
as Mr Mathew Rukikaire, from whose house the "revolution" was
launched, Mr Bidandi Ssali, Ms Miria Matembe, Mr Amanya Mushega,
Mr Richard Kaijuka, and former army commander Mugisha Muntu were
chased out of the NRM.
Having crippled the old parties and out-foxed internal
opposition within the NRM, Museveni soon found yet another centre
of independent thinking the judiciary. The old and new
opposition sought to use the democratic safeguards of the 1995
Constitution to challenge Museveni's increasingly autocratic rule
using the courts.
Between 1999 and 2004, the opposition won a series of victories
in the courts of law. When Museveni woke up to this trend, he took
his stand: he went on television and threatened judges, and the
next day his handlers organised thugs who demonstrated "against
the rule of law" and chased judges out of their chambers. After
this experience, we wait to see whether the courts will hold
strong.
With all these state and civic centres of opposition within
Uganda crippled, Museveni now stands at the pinnacle of his
political power. Across the political terrain, there is no
organised body to challenge his increasingly autocratic rule.
I have argued before that the only remaining challenge to his
authority i.e. "the" opposition is the donors (because of their
financial muscle), Rwanda (because of its military capacity) and
the media, especially Monitor (because it offers a platform to
those with an alternative view). I often joke with friends that
Monitor is not an opposition newspaper but "the" opposition.
Museveni is smart. He clearly understands that Monitor's
capacity to play this role is as much based on ideology as it is
on sound business and commercial considerations. In a country with
a one-man-knows-it-all President, and where every institution
state or civic has been crippled, to position oneself as
independent has a very high risk, but equally a critical market
advantage. Media thrive in a democratic environment, and therefore
Monitor has to support a democratic dispensation.
An independent stance brings audience and advertisers, thus
enhancing the company's financial independence. Financial
independence insulates Monitor as a business from state control
and direction.
The new strategy
The closure of KFM is only the beginning of a new strategy in
Museveni's long march to absolute power. In spite of
liberalisation and privatisation, the state in Uganda has remained
the largest consumer and formal sector employer. Private sector
companies that want to thrive need business from the state in form
of tenders, contracts, etc. Only those who support the President
may now find it possible to reap such benefits.
Already, collapsing private companies are subsidised by the
President at state expense in order to win over their owners.
Museveni understands that financial independence also means
political independence, and in the new phase that is one area he
is going to attack.
At Kololo on Wednesday, August 10, Museveni attacked all
independent media and threatened to close them down. Private FM
stations, with all their weaknesses, have for over a decade now
provided a forum for lively debate on national issues in a country
without organised opposition.
The closure of KFM is not aimed at its parent company Monitor
Publications Limited per se (that is only a sub-plot). Museveni
is using KFM to warn all other private FM stations on how to
behave in the next election campaigns.
The new strategy does not aim at journalists as professionals
but seeks to attack media organisations as businesses i.e. to
cripple their financial independence. It was not by mistake that
Museveni did not threaten action on "practicing journalism" but
"doing business" while speaking at Kololo. But it would be naïve
to think this attack would be restricted to media organisations.
Businesses independent of state patronage are going to come under
increasing strain too.
I have already argued that Museveni tolerated press freedom not
because he believed in it, but rather as an alibi to justify the
consolidation of one-party rule in the context of his dependence
on international creditors in the aftermath of the Cold War. Now
that his relationship with international donors is coming under
increasing strain because of his overt desire to become a
President-for-life, Museveni no longer needs any democratic
pretences. As his regime becomes more autocratic, his
international creditors will become shy and begin a phased
withdraw. Without international resources to pay for this vast
patronage, Museveni will seek to predate on the private
sector.
What the future holds
It has all happened in Africa before. To survive politically,
Museveni has to depend on others to produce economically. Over the
years he depended on international donors. If the donors withdraw,
it is unlikely that Museveni will seek to create wealth, which he
can tax to pay for his patronage.
Given his current autocratic style, Museveni will most likely
seek to capture wealth from those who possess it. This is because
creating wealth requires negotiating with those who own assets.
Such negotiation would require that Museveni listens to asset
holders on what public policies and political institutions are
necessary for rapid business growth. This would mean delegating
decision-making power i.e. conceding political liberty to those
whose wealth he desires.
Secondly, the foundation for wealth creation is actually
political restraint. Those who possess capital need guarantee that
when they invest it, their rights to property will be respected.
His Highness the Aga Khan who owns Monitor has other investments
in Uganda as well in the pharmaceutical industry, a dam in
Jinja, real estate, hotels, schools. If the government of Uganda
can close one of the lines of his business because a journalist
said something the President did not want to hear, it follows that
all his other businesses are at risk.
But it is not the Aga Khan alone: other owners of capital who
have invested or want to invest in Uganda get frightened because
the lack of political restraint places their investments at
risk.
The closure of KFM demonstrates not only the political
irrationality of this regime, but also how political irrationality
is self-destructive. The political basis of Museveni's government
has two levels. The first is political patronage to buy off the
elite class in Uganda using state jobs 78 presidential advisors,
more than 100 special assistants to the President, 68 Cabinet
ministers, a stadium-size Parliament, more than 80 commissions and
semi-autonomous government agencies, the creation of 47 new
districts which provide innumerable jobs and contracts to local
elites because 40 percent of the national budget is spent at the
district level.
The second basis is popular grassroots
benefits such as universal primary education and basic healthcare.
To sustain this vast patronage system and grassroots programmes
requires resources. Over the years, international creditors have
provided the money (called foreign aid) to support the system.
The President's options
If President Museveni is to walk away from international
creditors, he must find a new source of revenue. Only three
avenues are available. He can find a hole in the earth full of a
rich mineral diamonds, gold or oil. The state would not need to
democratise since it can exploit this rich mineral to raise
revenue to pay for its political survival. This explains why, in
spite of their wealth, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are dictatorships.
I do not see any such mineral yet.
The second, the state can ensure rapid business growth and
collect more tax revenue to compensate for donor withdraw. This
would call on the state to listen more to those who own capital,
and put in place guarantees that their investments are safe from
arbitrary rule all of which means the state must concede
political liberty.
Because Museveni is not in the mood to concede liberty and
exercise political restraint, there is the third option which
African dictators mastered in the 1960s and 1970s expropriation.
Here the state may decide to grab wealth from those who own it
the private sector through nationalisation as is happening in
Zimbabwe today.
If Museveni chooses this path, the first victims of
expropriation will be western companies (whose mother countries
will have withdrawn aid) and then South African and Asian
businesses and finally those among the indigenous Ugandan private
sector who do not support the regime or depend on it for
patronage.
If today a government can close a business in disregard to the
law under the flimsy excuse that an employee "insulted" the
President, then tomorrow another business will be closed because
its employees did not vote for the President, or that it did not
contribute campaign finance to the ruling party.
Secondly, when a government uses its power to seize resources
from those outside its core political constituency, it may make it
costly for any one group to withhold its political support. When
private businesses perceived as "unfriendly" face such political
predation, they can begin to compete among themselves to back the
government in power. Again the political history of Africa through
the 1960s and 70s is replete with this political pathology.
Nonetheless, whatever path he chooses the conclusion for
Museveni and his die-hard supporters in inevitable - political
restraint matters. Leaders always face a choice on whether to be
ruled by their egos - and thus run down the economic foundation of
their political survival - or to exercise political restraint by
allowing the growth of institutions that develop perspectives
independent of a leader's personal exercise of power. President
Museveni faces this choice starkly now than ever before.
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