Mulindwa, What do I have to do with this?
vukoni > -------- Original Message -------- > Subject: [Ugnet] Re: [Ugandacom] President Museveni's time is nigh > From: "Edward Mulindwa" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Date: Sat, August 20, 2005 8:01 pm > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Cc: [email protected] > > > Andrew Mwenda > > Yea and we need you as a journalist after Museveni, so forget the Vukoni's > who are using your case for cheap shots at the movement clean up or you are > not a journalist. > > > Em > Toronto > > The Mulindwas Communication Group > "With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy" > Groupe de communication Mulindwas > "avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie" > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: gook makanga > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Saturday, August 20, 2005 8:44 PM > Subject: [Ugandacom] President Museveni's time is nigh > > > August 21 - 27, 2005 > > Every now and then a time of reckoning comes, and President Museveni's is > nigh > > ANDREW M. MWENDA > > > > President Museveni's decision to close KFM radio station on August 11 because > of my radio show of the previous day and throw me in jail came exactly as > expected. > > Strategically, this is a sign of political weakness not strength. This > strategy is not new. After the 2001 presidential elections, Mr Museveni meted > out unmitigated harassment against his opponent Kizza Besigye and wife Winnie > Byanyima leading to their escape from the country. I wrote a three-part > article in Sunday Monitor in October 2001 arguing that this harassment was > not aimed at Dr Besigye and Ms Byanyima although they were the victims of it. > Rather Museveni was using it to demonstrate to other historical pillars of > the NRM the costs of taking Besigye's path. In colonial parlance, this was > called "gunboat diplomacy". TACTICAL MANOEUVRES: Gen. Museveni. File > photo > > > As with Besigye and Byanyima, the President did not aim at KFM or Monitor > Publications Limited. His target goes beyond the media and independent > private enterprises to threaten freedom of expression generally. Much more > broadly, the target of Museveni in this action is the wider Ugandan society, > which he wants to subdue on his path to consolidate a one-man totalitarian > regime. Over the last 20 years, Museveni has sustained his strategy of > neutralising and destroying every organisation or institution that stands > independent of him. > > Background > > In 1986 when he was politically weak, he consolidated his position through an > inclusive strategy that brought other political parties, especially the > Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) and the Democratic Party (DP) into a > broad-based government. But this was only a tactical manoeuvre to win a > strategic objective consolidating his power. Museveni then used the > "gentleman's agreement" with these parties to keep them in a cooler while > using resistance councils to consolidate the NRM at the grassroots. > > By 1994, the parties had been weakened by co-optation, legal restrictions and > eight years of hate propaganda to suffer a resounding defeat in the > Constituent Assembly elections, a defeat that was consolidated by the 1996 > presidential and parliamentary elections. > > However, Museveni's strategy of political consolidation was heavily reliant > on financial aid from international creditors. This made it difficult for him > to consolidate one party rule in the post-Cold War world unless he > demonstrated some commitment to democratic values, hence press freedom, some > judicial independence and other democratic safeguards under the 1995 > Constitution. > > Museveni also exploited donor-sponsored economic reforms to destroy other > forms of civic organisation independent of him such as trade unions and > co-operatives. In their wake, what emerged was a "civil society" dominated by > foreign aid-funded local and international NGOs who except for a few are > merely vehicles of income for their employees than representatives of a > vibrant civic life. > > Although the Sixth Parliament was actually a one-party Parliament dominated > by NRM members, it sought to impose checks on how Museveni managed (or should > we say mismanaged) state affairs. > > By weakening external opposition to him in form of DP and UPC, Museveni had > inadvertently allowed submerged tensions within NRM to take centre stage. As > a result, a new opposition now formed around the moderate and progressive > wing within the NRM itself against its more extremist and anti-democratic > elements. The progressives inside the NRM united with the opposition in the > old political parties around the Young Parliamentarians Association and > formed a vibrant political force. > > The new opposition > > As battles raged between the two sides, Museveni sought to remove this > alternative platform taking shape inside the NRM but more reflected in the > institution of Parliament. Between 1998 and 2003, he progressively weakened > the moderate, enlightened and pro-democratic faction of the NRM, while at the > same time neutralising Parliament as an institution. > > The period 2003-2005 has been instructive as Museveni was able to realise > this vision. Mr Eriya Kategaya, his childhood friend and deputy prime > minister, and other former Cabinet ministers such as Mr Mathew Rukikaire, > from whose house the "revolution" was launched, Mr Bidandi Ssali, Ms Miria > Matembe, Mr Amanya Mushega, Mr Richard Kaijuka, and former army commander > Mugisha Muntu were chased out of the NRM. > > Having crippled the old parties and out-foxed internal opposition within the > NRM, Museveni soon found yet another centre of independent thinking the > judiciary. The old and new opposition sought to use the democratic safeguards > of the 1995 Constitution to challenge Museveni's increasingly autocratic rule > using the courts. > > Between 1999 and 2004, the opposition won a series of victories in the courts > of law. When Museveni woke up to this trend, he took his stand: he went on > television and threatened judges, and the next day his handlers organised > thugs who demonstrated "against the rule of law" and chased judges out of > their chambers. After this experience, we wait to see whether the courts will > hold strong. > > With all these state and civic centres of opposition within Uganda crippled, > Museveni now stands at the pinnacle of his political power. Across the > political terrain, there is no organised body to challenge his increasingly > autocratic rule. > I have argued before that the only remaining challenge to his authority i.e. > "the" opposition is the donors (because of their financial muscle), Rwanda > (because of its military capacity) and the media, especially Monitor (because > it offers a platform to those with an alternative view). I often joke with > friends that Monitor is not an opposition newspaper but "the" opposition. > > Museveni is smart. He clearly understands that Monitor's capacity to play > this role is as much based on ideology as it is on sound business and > commercial considerations. In a country with a one-man-knows-it-all > President, and where every institution state or civic has been crippled, > to position oneself as independent has a very high risk, but equally a > critical market advantage. Media thrive in a democratic environment, and > therefore Monitor has to support a democratic dispensation. > > An independent stance brings audience and advertisers, thus enhancing the > company's financial independence. Financial independence insulates Monitor as > a business from state control and direction. > > The new strategy > > The closure of KFM is only the beginning of a new strategy in Museveni's long > march to absolute power. In spite of liberalisation and privatisation, the > state in Uganda has remained the largest consumer and formal sector employer. > Private sector companies that want to thrive need business from the state in > form of tenders, contracts, etc. Only those who support the President may now > find it possible to reap such benefits. > > Already, collapsing private companies are subsidised by the President at > state expense in order to win over their owners. Museveni understands that > financial independence also means political independence, and in the new > phase that is one area he is going to attack. > > At Kololo on Wednesday, August 10, Museveni attacked all independent media > and threatened to close them down. Private FM stations, with all their > weaknesses, have for over a decade now provided a forum for lively debate on > national issues in a country without organised opposition. > > The closure of KFM is not aimed at its parent company Monitor Publications > Limited per se (that is only a sub-plot). Museveni is using KFM to warn all > other private FM stations on how to behave in the next election campaigns. > > The new strategy does not aim at journalists as professionals but seeks to > attack media organisations as businesses i.e. to cripple their financial > independence. It was not by mistake that Museveni did not threaten action on > "practicing journalism" but "doing business" while speaking at Kololo. But it > would be naïve to think this attack would be restricted to media > organisations. Businesses independent of state patronage are going to come > under increasing strain too. > > I have already argued that Museveni tolerated press freedom not because he > believed in it, but rather as an alibi to justify the consolidation of > one-party rule in the context of his dependence on international creditors in > the aftermath of the Cold War. Now that his relationship with international > donors is coming under increasing strain because of his overt desire to > become a President-for-life, Museveni no longer needs any democratic > pretences. As his regime becomes more autocratic, his international creditors > will become shy and begin a phased withdraw. Without international resources > to pay for this vast patronage, Museveni will seek to predate on the private > sector. > > What the future holds > > It has all happened in Africa before. To survive politically, Museveni has to > depend on others to produce economically. Over the years he depended on > international donors. If the donors withdraw, it is unlikely that Museveni > will seek to create wealth, which he can tax to pay for his patronage. > > Given his current autocratic style, Museveni will most likely seek to capture > wealth from those who possess it. This is because creating wealth requires > negotiating with those who own assets. Such negotiation would require that > Museveni listens to asset holders on what public policies and political > institutions are necessary for rapid business growth. This would mean > delegating decision-making power i.e. conceding political liberty to those > whose wealth he desires. > > Secondly, the foundation for wealth creation is actually political restraint. > Those who possess capital need guarantee that when they invest it, their > rights to property will be respected. His Highness the Aga Khan who owns > Monitor has other investments in Uganda as well in the pharmaceutical > industry, a dam in Jinja, real estate, hotels, schools. If the government of > Uganda can close one of the lines of his business because a journalist said > something the President did not want to hear, it follows that all his other > businesses are at risk. > > But it is not the Aga Khan alone: other owners of capital who have invested > or want to invest in Uganda get frightened because the lack of political > restraint places their investments at risk. > > The closure of KFM demonstrates not only the political irrationality of this > regime, but also how political irrationality is self-destructive. The > political basis of Museveni's government has two levels. The first is > political patronage to buy off the elite class in Uganda using state jobs > 78 presidential advisors, more than 100 special assistants to the President, > 68 Cabinet ministers, a stadium-size Parliament, more than 80 commissions and > semi-autonomous government agencies, the creation of 47 new districts which > provide innumerable jobs and contracts to local elites because 40 percent of > the national budget is spent at the district level. > > The second basis is popular grassroots benefits such as universal primary > education and basic healthcare. To sustain this vast patronage system and > grassroots programmes requires resources. Over the years, international > creditors have provided the money (called foreign aid) to support the system. > > > The President's options > > If President Museveni is to walk away from international creditors, he must > find a new source of revenue. Only three avenues are available. He can find a > hole in the earth full of a rich mineral diamonds, gold or oil. The state > would not need to democratise since it can exploit this rich mineral to raise > revenue to pay for its political survival. This explains why, in spite of > their wealth, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are dictatorships. I do not see any > such mineral yet. > > The second, the state can ensure rapid business growth and collect more tax > revenue to compensate for donor withdraw. This would call on the state to > listen more to those who own capital, and put in place guarantees that their > investments are safe from arbitrary rule all of which means the state must > concede political liberty. > > Because Museveni is not in the mood to concede liberty and exercise political > restraint, there is the third option which African dictators mastered in the > 1960s and 1970s expropriation. Here the state may decide to grab wealth > from those who own it the private sector through nationalisation as is > happening in Zimbabwe today. > > If Museveni chooses this path, the first victims of expropriation will be > western companies (whose mother countries will have withdrawn aid) and then > South African and Asian businesses and finally those among the indigenous > Ugandan private sector who do not support the regime or depend on it for > patronage. > > If today a government can close a business in disregard to the law under the > flimsy excuse that an employee "insulted" the President, then tomorrow > another business will be closed because its employees did not vote for the > President, or that it did not contribute campaign finance to the ruling > party. > > Secondly, when a government uses its power to seize resources from those > outside its core political constituency, it may make it costly for any one > group to withhold its political support. When private businesses perceived as > "unfriendly" face such political predation, they can begin to compete among > themselves to back the government in power. Again the political history of > Africa through the 1960s and 70s is replete with this political pathology. > > Nonetheless, whatever path he chooses the conclusion for Museveni and his > die-hard supporters in inevitable - political restraint matters. Leaders > always face a choice on whether to be ruled by their egos - and thus run down > the economic foundation of their political survival - or to exercise > political restraint by allowing the growth of institutions that develop > perspectives independent of a leader's personal exercise of power. President > Museveni faces this choice starkly now than ever before. > > > > > > > Gook > > > > SPONSORED LINKS Sake Running Body Service > > > YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS > Visit your group "Ugandacom" on the web. > To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of Service. > > > > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > _______________________________________________ > Ugandanet mailing list > [email protected] > http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/ugandanet > % UGANDANET is generously hosted by INFOCOM http://www.infocom.co.ug/ _______________________________________________ Ugandanet mailing list [email protected] http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/ugandanet % UGANDANET is generously hosted by INFOCOM http://www.infocom.co.ug/
