That's a non-answer, my friend. But it's so typical of you. So, I'm not surprised at all.
> -------- Original Message -------- > Subject: Re: [Ugnet] Re: [Ugandacom] President Museveni's time is nigh > From: "Edward Mulindwa" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Date: Sat, August 27, 2005 4:29 am > To: <[email protected]> > > You have no idea > > > Em > Toronto > > The Mulindwas Communication Group > "With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy" > Groupe de communication Mulindwas > "avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie" > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <[email protected]> > Sent: Friday, August 26, 2005 9:23 PM > Subject: RE: [Ugnet] Re: [Ugandacom] President Museveni's time is nigh > > > > Mulindwa, > > > > What do I have to do with this? > > > > vukoni > > > > > >> -------- Original Message -------- > >> Subject: [Ugnet] Re: [Ugandacom] President Museveni's time is nigh > >> From: "Edward Mulindwa" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >> Date: Sat, August 20, 2005 8:01 pm > >> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, > >> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >> Cc: [email protected] > >> > >> > >> Andrew Mwenda > >> > >> Yea and we need you as a journalist after Museveni, so forget the > >> Vukoni's who are using your case for cheap shots at the movement clean up > >> or you are not a journalist. > >> > >> > >> Em > >> Toronto > >> > >> The Mulindwas Communication Group > >> "With Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is in anarchy" > >> Groupe de communication Mulindwas > >> "avec Yoweri Museveni, l'Ouganda est dans l'anarchie" > >> > >> ----- Original Message ----- > >> From: gook makanga > >> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >> Sent: Saturday, August 20, 2005 8:44 PM > >> Subject: [Ugandacom] President Museveni's time is nigh > >> > >> > >> August 21 - 27, 2005 > >> > >> Every now and then a time of reckoning comes, and President > >> Museveni's is nigh > >> > >> ANDREW M. MWENDA > >> > >> > >> > >> President Museveni's decision to close KFM radio station on August 11 > >> because of my radio show of the previous day and throw me in jail came > >> exactly as expected. > >> > >> Strategically, this is a sign of political weakness not strength. This > >> strategy is not new. After the 2001 presidential elections, Mr Museveni > >> meted out unmitigated harassment against his opponent Kizza Besigye and > >> wife Winnie Byanyima leading to their escape from the country. I wrote a > >> three-part article in Sunday Monitor in October 2001 arguing that this > >> harassment was not aimed at Dr Besigye and Ms Byanyima although they were > >> the victims of it. Rather Museveni was using it to demonstrate to other > >> historical pillars of the NRM the costs of taking Besigye's path. In > >> colonial parlance, this was called "gunboat diplomacy". TACTICAL > >> MANOEUVRES: Gen. Museveni. File photo > >> > >> > >> As with Besigye and Byanyima, the President did not aim at KFM or Monitor > >> Publications Limited. His target goes beyond the media and independent > >> private enterprises to threaten freedom of expression generally. Much > >> more broadly, the target of Museveni in this action is the wider Ugandan > >> society, which he wants to subdue on his path to consolidate a one-man > >> totalitarian regime. Over the last 20 years, Museveni has sustained his > >> strategy of neutralising and destroying every organisation or institution > >> that stands independent of him. > >> > >> Background > >> > >> In 1986 when he was politically weak, he consolidated his position > >> through an inclusive strategy that brought other political parties, > >> especially the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) and the Democratic Party > >> (DP) into a broad-based government. But this was only a tactical > >> manoeuvre to win a strategic objective - consolidating his power. > >> Museveni then used the "gentleman's agreement" with these parties to keep > >> them in a cooler while using resistance councils to consolidate the NRM > >> at the grassroots. > >> > >> By 1994, the parties had been weakened by co-optation, legal restrictions > >> and eight years of hate propaganda to suffer a resounding defeat in the > >> Constituent Assembly elections, a defeat that was consolidated by the > >> 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections. > >> > >> However, Museveni's strategy of political consolidation was heavily > >> reliant on financial aid from international creditors. This made it > >> difficult for him to consolidate one party rule in the post-Cold War > >> world unless he demonstrated some commitment to democratic values, hence > >> press freedom, some judicial independence and other democratic safeguards > >> under the 1995 Constitution. > >> > >> Museveni also exploited donor-sponsored economic reforms to destroy other > >> forms of civic organisation independent of him such as trade unions and > >> co-operatives. In their wake, what emerged was a "civil society" > >> dominated by foreign aid-funded local and international NGOs who - except > >> for a few - are merely vehicles of income for their employees than > >> representatives of a vibrant civic life. > >> > >> Although the Sixth Parliament was actually a one-party Parliament > >> dominated by NRM members, it sought to impose checks on how Museveni > >> managed (or should we say mismanaged) state affairs. > >> > >> By weakening external opposition to him in form of DP and UPC, Museveni > >> had inadvertently allowed submerged tensions within NRM to take centre > >> stage. As a result, a new opposition now formed around the moderate and > >> progressive wing within the NRM itself against its more extremist and > >> anti-democratic elements. The progressives inside the NRM united with the > >> opposition in the old political parties around the Young Parliamentarians > >> Association and formed a vibrant political force. > >> > >> The new opposition > >> > >> As battles raged between the two sides, Museveni sought to remove this > >> alternative platform taking shape inside the NRM but more reflected in > >> the institution of Parliament. Between 1998 and 2003, he progressively > >> weakened the moderate, enlightened and pro-democratic faction of the NRM, > >> while at the same time neutralising Parliament as an institution. > >> > >> The period 2003-2005 has been instructive as Museveni was able to realise > >> this vision. Mr Eriya Kategaya, his childhood friend and deputy prime > >> minister, and other former Cabinet ministers such as Mr Mathew Rukikaire, > >> from whose house the "revolution" was launched, Mr Bidandi Ssali, Ms > >> Miria Matembe, Mr Amanya Mushega, Mr Richard Kaijuka, and former army > >> commander Mugisha Muntu were chased out of the NRM. > >> > >> Having crippled the old parties and out-foxed internal opposition within > >> the NRM, Museveni soon found yet another centre of independent thinking - > >> the judiciary. The old and new opposition sought to use the democratic > >> safeguards of the 1995 Constitution to challenge Museveni's increasingly > >> autocratic rule using the courts. > >> > >> Between 1999 and 2004, the opposition won a series of victories in the > >> courts of law. When Museveni woke up to this trend, he took his stand: he > >> went on television and threatened judges, and the next day his handlers > >> organised thugs who demonstrated "against the rule of law" and chased > >> judges out of their chambers. After this experience, we wait to see > >> whether the courts will hold strong. > >> > >> With all these state and civic centres of opposition within Uganda > >> crippled, Museveni now stands at the pinnacle of his political power. > >> Across the political terrain, there is no organised body to challenge his > >> increasingly autocratic rule. > >> I have argued before that the only remaining challenge to his authority > >> i.e. "the" opposition is the donors (because of their financial muscle), > >> Rwanda (because of its military capacity) and the media, especially > >> Monitor (because it offers a platform to those with an alternative view). > >> I often joke with friends that Monitor is not an opposition newspaper but > >> "the" opposition. > >> > >> Museveni is smart. He clearly understands that Monitor's capacity to play > >> this role is as much based on ideology as it is on sound business and > >> commercial considerations. In a country with a one-man-knows-it-all > >> President, and where every institution - state or civic - has been > >> crippled, to position oneself as independent has a very high risk, but > >> equally a critical market advantage. Media thrive in a democratic > >> environment, and therefore Monitor has to support a democratic > >> dispensation. > >> > >> An independent stance brings audience and advertisers, thus enhancing the > >> company's financial independence. Financial independence insulates > >> Monitor as a business from state control and direction. > >> > >> The new strategy > >> > >> The closure of KFM is only the beginning of a new strategy in Museveni's > >> long march to absolute power. In spite of liberalisation and > >> privatisation, the state in Uganda has remained the largest consumer and > >> formal sector employer. Private sector companies that want to thrive need > >> business from the state in form of tenders, contracts, etc. Only those > >> who support the President may now find it possible to reap such benefits. > >> > >> Already, collapsing private companies are subsidised by the President at > >> state expense in order to win over their owners. Museveni understands > >> that financial independence also means political independence, and in the > >> new phase that is one area he is going to attack. > >> > >> At Kololo on Wednesday, August 10, Museveni attacked all independent > >> media and threatened to close them down. Private FM stations, with all > >> their weaknesses, have for over a decade now provided a forum for lively > >> debate on national issues in a country without organised opposition. > >> > >> The closure of KFM is not aimed at its parent company - Monitor > >> Publications Limited - per se (that is only a sub-plot). Museveni is > >> using KFM to warn all other private FM stations on how to behave in the > >> next election campaigns. > >> > >> The new strategy does not aim at journalists as professionals but seeks > >> to attack media organisations as businesses i.e. to cripple their > >> financial independence. It was not by mistake that Museveni did not > >> threaten action on "practicing journalism" but "doing business" while > >> speaking at Kololo. But it would be naïve to think this attack would be > >> restricted to media organisations. Businesses independent of state > >> patronage are going to come under increasing strain too. > >> > >> I have already argued that Museveni tolerated press freedom not because > >> he believed in it, but rather as an alibi to justify the consolidation of > >> one-party rule in the context of his dependence on international > >> creditors in the aftermath of the Cold War. Now that his relationship > >> with international donors is coming under increasing strain because of > >> his overt desire to become a President-for-life, Museveni no longer needs > >> any democratic pretences. As his regime becomes more autocratic, his > >> international creditors will become shy and begin a phased withdraw. > >> Without international resources to pay for this vast patronage, Museveni > >> will seek to predate on the private sector. > >> > >> What the future holds > >> > >> It has all happened in Africa before. To survive politically, Museveni > >> has to depend on others to produce economically. Over the years he > >> depended on international donors. If the donors withdraw, it is unlikely > >> that Museveni will seek to create wealth, which he can tax to pay for his > >> patronage. > >> > >> Given his current autocratic style, Museveni will most likely seek to > >> capture wealth from those who possess it. This is because creating wealth > >> requires negotiating with those who own assets. Such negotiation would > >> require that Museveni listens to asset holders on what public policies > >> and political institutions are necessary for rapid business growth. This > >> would mean delegating decision-making power i.e. conceding political > >> liberty to those whose wealth he desires. > >> > >> Secondly, the foundation for wealth creation is actually political > >> restraint. Those who possess capital need guarantee that when they invest > >> it, their rights to property will be respected. His Highness the Aga Khan > >> who owns Monitor has other investments in Uganda as well - in the > >> pharmaceutical industry, a dam in Jinja, real estate, hotels, schools. If > >> the government of Uganda can close one of the lines of his business > >> because a journalist said something the President did not want to hear, > >> it follows that all his other businesses are at risk. > >> > >> But it is not the Aga Khan alone: other owners of capital who have > >> invested or want to invest in Uganda get frightened because the lack of > >> political restraint places their investments at risk. > >> > >> The closure of KFM demonstrates not only the political irrationality of > >> this regime, but also how political irrationality is self-destructive. > >> The political basis of Museveni's government has two levels. The first is > >> political patronage to buy off the elite class in Uganda using state > >> jobs - 78 presidential advisors, more than 100 special assistants to the > >> President, 68 Cabinet ministers, a stadium-size Parliament, more than 80 > >> commissions and semi-autonomous government agencies, the creation of 47 > >> new districts which provide innumerable jobs and contracts to local > >> elites because 40 percent of the national budget is spent at the district > >> level. > >> > >> The second basis is popular grassroots benefits such as universal primary > >> education and basic healthcare. To sustain this vast patronage system and > >> grassroots programmes requires resources. Over the years, international > >> creditors have provided the money (called foreign aid) to support the > >> system. > >> > >> The President's options > >> > >> If President Museveni is to walk away from international creditors, he > >> must find a new source of revenue. Only three avenues are available. He > >> can find a hole in the earth full of a rich mineral - diamonds, gold or > >> oil. The state would not need to democratise since it can exploit this > >> rich mineral to raise revenue to pay for its political survival. This > >> explains why, in spite of their wealth, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are > >> dictatorships. I do not see any such mineral yet. > >> > >> The second, the state can ensure rapid business growth and collect more > >> tax revenue to compensate for donor withdraw. This would call on the > >> state to listen more to those who own capital, and put in place > >> guarantees that their investments are safe from arbitrary rule - all of > >> which means the state must concede political liberty. > >> > >> Because Museveni is not in the mood to concede liberty and exercise > >> political restraint, there is the third option which African dictators > >> mastered in the 1960s and 1970s - expropriation. Here the state may > >> decide to grab wealth from those who own it - the private sector - > >> through nationalisation as is happening in Zimbabwe today. > >> > >> If Museveni chooses this path, the first victims of expropriation will be > >> western companies (whose mother countries will have withdrawn aid) and > >> then South African and Asian businesses and finally those among the > >> indigenous Ugandan private sector who do not support the regime or depend > >> on it for patronage. > >> > >> If today a government can close a business in disregard to the law under > >> the flimsy excuse that an employee "insulted" the President, then > >> tomorrow another business will be closed because its employees did not > >> vote for the President, or that it did not contribute campaign finance to > >> the ruling party. > >> > >> Secondly, when a government uses its power to seize resources from those > >> outside its core political constituency, it may make it costly for any > >> one group to withhold its political support. When private businesses > >> perceived as "unfriendly" face such political predation, they can begin > >> to compete among themselves to back the government in power. Again the > >> political history of Africa through the 1960s and 70s is replete with > >> this political pathology. > >> > >> Nonetheless, whatever path he chooses the conclusion for Museveni and his > >> die-hard supporters in inevitable - political restraint matters. Leaders > >> always face a choice on whether to be ruled by their egos - and thus run > >> down the economic foundation of their political survival - or to exercise > >> political restraint by allowing the growth of institutions that develop > >> perspectives independent of a leader's personal exercise of power. > >> President Museveni faces this choice starkly now than ever before. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> Gook > >> > >> > >> > >> SPONSORED LINKS Sake Running Body Service > >> > >> > >> YAHOO! 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