Jack, Thanks for your answer. I guess, I'm a little confused by general architecture choice. It doesn't seem to be consistent to me. I mean, if we are building the layer of database specific security (i.e. we are saying, let's assume intruder is on the box, and he is root, what we can do?), then it is perfectly logical to build keystore and truststore, hide our keys and certificates there, encrypt the file with passwords from these stores and keep the key of the box. That is great, and as a security architect I applaud this.
Now, if we are saying - no, we are banking on the fact nobody will break into the box, and if root is lost - all bets are off, that is fine too. But in this case, what is the point to even have keystore and truststore? Thanks, Oleg On Thu, Jan 14, 2016 at 4:38 PM, Jack Krupansky <jack.krupan...@gmail.com> wrote: > The point of encryption in Cassandra is to protect data in flight between > the cluster and clients (or between nodes in the cluster.) The presumption > is that normal system network access control (e.g., remote login, etc.) > will preclude bad actors from directly accessing the file system on a > cluster node. > > -- Jack Krupansky > > On Thu, Jan 14, 2016 at 5:16 PM, oleg yusim <olegyu...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Greetings, >> >> Guys, can you please help me to understand following: >> >> I'm reading through the way keystore and truststore are implemented, and >> it is all fine and great, but at the end Cassandra documentation >> instructing to extract all the keystore content and leave all certs and >> keys in a clear. >> >> Do I miss something here? Why are we doing it? What is the point to even >> have a keystore then? It doesn't look very secure to me... >> >> Another item - cassandra.yaml has passwords from keystore and truststore >> - clear text... what is the point to have these stores then, if passwords >> are out? >> >> Thanks, >> >> Oleg >> > >
