On 10/30/2010 11:11 PM, Darryl Lewis wrote:
Yeah, well reasoned rebuttal there....not. That's why we encrypt passwords in unix, or haven't you looked at etc/passwd lately?
Have *you* ever looked at the etc/passwd? First of all it is not encrypted. It contains a hash value of the password so you cannot get the clear text password back.
Are you going to tell me that is complete nonsense?
Since connection to database requires a "real" password if encrypted on the disk there must be a way to decrypt it at runtime. This can be done by some obscurity algorithm or by providing a key store password at application startup. Providing a key store password is either done interactively or by a special hardware devices. Since the second are expensive and the first one are inappropriate for server based software, securing the passwords in clear text form is the only solution. Just obscuring the passwords with what ever algorithm is not secure. > Having a username and password in clear text allows another account to be compromised. If your database user equals to an user account on other box then yes. But FYI those are usually kept different. Aye you going to tell me that you use login accounts for database accounts? Regards -- ^TM --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscr...@tomcat.apache.org For additional commands, e-mail: users-h...@tomcat.apache.org
