On 1/7/19 6:24 AM, Vittorio Bertola wrote:
Il 7 gennaio 2019 alle 13.23 Viruthagiri Thirumavalavan <[email protected]> ha scritto:@Vittorio BertolaHello,it looks like you misinterpreted my reply completely, reading things in it that I never thought or said, but in any case, if you felt offended by it, I apologize. I actually think that the IETF is often too unwelcoming and rude to new participants and I do not want to be part of that attitude at all. At the same time, though I actually praised your boldness in repeatedly trying to tackle big issues, the consensus seems to be that your proposal cannot be supported, no matter how much you fix it, and so there is not much help we can give you, other than explaining to you the technical reasons for that conclusion, as I did in my reply; please accept the conclusion without taking it as a personal attack.
Hear hear, and I share the passion too.If it were up to me, an RFC would be published deprecating opportunistic TLS for SMTP.
System administrators would have three years, but after that, TLS 1.3+ would be required for SMTP.
Reason for TLS 1.3+ is that it requires ciphers with forward secrecy. But I know it will never fly. It's what I want though.
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