Posted by Jim Lindgren:
Does Asking More Questions Tip the Outcome of Supreme Court Cases?--
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_05_08-2005_05_14.shtml#1115878999


   Tony Mauro has an [1]interesting article on whether the number and
   tone of Supreme Court questions can tip off the final result in the
   case:

     In a new study entitled "The Illusion of Devil's Advocacy: How the
     Justices of the Supreme Court Foreshadow their Decisions During
     Oral Argument," Sarah Shullman came up with a surprisingly simple
     and accurate way of predicting outcomes based on the number and
     tenor of oral argument questions by justices.

     Shullman's article, in The Journal of Appellate Practice and
     Process, reports on oral arguments in 10 cases she observed during
     the October 2002 term. As she watched, she tallied the number and
     tenor -- helpful or hostile -- of all the questions asked by all
     the justices. Then a student at Georgetown University Law Center,
     Shullman is now an associate at Steel Hector & Davis in West Palm
     Beach, Fla.

     After seven of the 10 cases she studied were decided, Shullman
     looked for correlations -- and found them. In all of the cases, the
     justices in aggregate asked more questions, and more hostile
     questions, of the party that ultimately lost the case. The model of
     the devil's advocate -- peppering the side you favor with tough
     questions -- did not appear prevalent enough to derail this
     conclusion. . . .

     In any event, on the basis of her early success, Shullman proceeded
     to predict the remaining three cases she had charted that were
     still pending before the high court. And bingo! She was correct
     each time. A couple of justices strayed and asked more questions of
     the side they ultimately favored, but overall the justices turned
     out to be "quite predictable," she says. . . .

     Shullman acknowledges that her sample was small, but the
     methodology has already been tested since she did her study. John
     Roberts Jr., one of the masters of the trade before taking the
     bench in 2003, used her theory for a talk he gave on oral advocacy
     before the Supreme Court Historical Society last year. Picking 14
     oral arguments from the 1980 term and 14 from the 2003 term,
     Roberts found that in fact the most questions went to the losing
     party in 24 of the 28 cases -- an 86 percent rate of accuracy.

     "The secret to successful advocacy," Roberts deadpanned in
     conclusion, "is simply to get the Court to ask your opponent more
     questions."

     An 86 percent success rate in making predictions compares favorably
     with that of other players in the growing field of Supreme Court
     prognosticators. Political scientists have gotten into the game to
     test the relative importance of precedents and politics in Supreme
     Court decision making. The Supreme Court Forecasting Project, based
     at Washington University in St. Louis, used statistical models and
     a panel of experts to predict the results in the cases argued in
     the 2002 term. The statistical method, based on data such as the
     circuit of origin and an analysis of precedents, came out right 75
     percent of the time, while the human experts predicted outcomes
     correctly in 59 percent of the cases.

     At a symposium on the project, Linda Greenhouse of The New York
     Times got into the spirit of things and looked back at her stories
     from the same term and found that in the 16 decided cases in which
     she ventured a prediction, she was right 75 percent of the time.

   It's not surprising that this might be so, but the numbers in the
   small-scale studies being discussed were stronger than I would have
   thought. The story didn't indicate whether any significance tests were
   done on the data, and without the exact baseline on the % of reversals
   of the lower court for these cases, I couldn't do the statistics
   myself.

   I went back and roughly counted the number of questions in [2]Raich,
   the marijuana Commerce Clause case that Randy Barnett argued. Randy
   got MANY more questions than the government, a bad sign for Randy (and
   the constitution).

   In skimming the [3]transcript in Raich, at [4]pages 40-41 I also
   noticed a somewhat playful disagreement between Barnett and Justice
   Scalia over what "home consumption" of wheat meant in Wickard v.
   Filburn. Randy said it included wheat consumed by the livestock on the
   farm; Scalia disagreed, saying it meant wheat eaten by the farmer and
   his family. I went back and read Wickard. Although there are some
   ambiguous passages, two passages are clear:

     It is urged that under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,
     Article I, ยง 8, clause 3, Congress does not possess the power it
     has in this instance sought to exercise. The question would merit
     little consideration since our decision in United States v. Darby,
     312 U.S. 100, n12 sustaining the federal power to regulate
     production of goods for commerce, except for the fact that this Act
     extends federal regulation to production not intended in any part
     for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm. HN3The Act
     includes a definition of "market" and its derivatives, so that as
     related to wheat, in addition to its conventional meaning, it also
     means to dispose of "by feeding (in any [*119] form) to poultry or
     livestock which, or the products of which, are sold, bartered, or
     exchanged, or to be so disposed of." n13 Hence, marketing quotas
     not only embrace all that may be sold without penalty but also what
     may be consumed on the premises.

   And this:

     had he chosen to cut his excess and cure it or feed it as hay, or
     to reap and feed it with the head and straw together, no penalty
     would have been demanded. Such manner of consumption is not
     uncommon.

   So Randy is correct on Wickard. Let's hope he is determined to be
   correct: that the interstate commerce clause applies to "interstate
   commerce," not intrastate noncommerce.

References

   1. http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1115802310553
   2. http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2004_12_12-2004_12_18.shtml#1102980187
   3. 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-1454.pdf
   4. 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-1454.pdf

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