Yeah, and they did not have an internally designed controller in that case. The Iranians purchased a standard system from what I read. It is much easier to monkey around with a controller that anyone can purchase than one where you change the software at will. Rossi apparently is developing his own control software. Do you know otherwise? Consider the case of Linux systems compared to Windows devices. The very frequent updates keep malicious code under control. The closer you hold the source code and version distributions to your chest, the more difficult it becomes for bad guys to interfere.
Dave -----Original Message----- From: Axil Axil <janap...@gmail.com> To: vortex-l <vortex-l@eskimo.com> Sent: Tue, Dec 9, 2014 4:13 pm Subject: Re: [Vo]:more energy in disputes than from cells The Iranians lost control of their centrifuges, and they were not on the internet. The infection came in on a memory stick. On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 4:08 PM, David Roberson <dlrober...@aol.com> wrote: You assume that these ECAT systems must be connected to the Internet. If that connection is too dangerous then it should not be standard until the vulnerabilities are resolved. Of course it is modern to monitor and control things by connection to the internet, but that is not the only choice. Dave -----Original Message----- From: Axil Axil <janap...@gmail.com> To: vortex-l <vortex-l@eskimo.com> Sent: Tue, Dec 9, 2014 3:35 pm Subject: Re: [Vo]:more energy in disputes than from cells How will Russia kept their oil and gas products running in the face of Rossi's E-Cat challenge? Here's how. SCADA Strangelove: Zero-days & hacking for full remote control Speaking of critical SCADA systems online and the risks to them…after finding more than 60,000 exposed control systems online, two Russian security researchers found vulnerabilities that could be exploited to take “full control of systems running energy, chemical and transportation systems.” At the Chaos Communication Congress, 30C3, Positive Research chief technology officer Sergey Gordeychik and consultant Gleb Gritsai said they demonstrated “how to get full control of industrial infrastructure” to the energy, oil and gas, chemical and transportation sectors. “The vulnerabilities,” according to the Australian IT News, “existed in the way passwords were encrypted and stored in the software's Project database and allowed attackers to gain full access to Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) using attacks described as dangerous and easy to launch.” They probed and found holes in “popular and high-end ICS and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems used to control everything from home solar panel installations to critical national infrastructure.” There are also numerous vulnerabilities in “home systems -- exposed to the public internet and at risk of attack.” In one case, the researchers responsibly disclosed a “vulnerability in the cloud SCADA platform Daq Connect which allowed attackers running a demonstration kiosk to access other customer installations." The vendor's totally unhelpful response was to tell the researchers “to simply 'not do' the attacks.” The SCADA Strangelove project has identified more than 150 zero-day vulnerabilities in SCADA, ICS and PLCs, with five percent of those being “dangerous remote code execution holes.” At 30C3, they released an updated version of THC-Hydra, “a password-cracking tool that targeted the vulnerability in Siemens PLC S-300 devices,” and a “Pretty Shiny Sparkly ICS/SCADA/PLC Cheat Sheet,” identifying almost 600 ICS, PLC and SCADA systems, so you too can “become a real SCADA Hacker.” On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 3:05 PM, Axil Axil <janap...@gmail.com> wrote: Rossihas publicly stated that he is using over 100 computers to implementhis latest control stratagem. From this meager bit of information wecan deduce fairly much what is going on with the 1 megawatt clusterE-Cat reactor. That number of computers means he is using a SCADAsystem to do the command and control function to keep his creation inline. Theterm SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) usually refersto a centralized system which monitors and controls the industrialinfrastructure of entire sites, or complexes of systems spread outover large areas (anything from an industrial plant to a nation).Most localized control actions are performed automatically by RemoteTerminal Unit (RTU)s or by Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)s.These are computer boards which are controlled by a low levelmicrocomputer usually housed in a rack mounted enclosure using a fullduplex bus structure to communicate with a master controlstation(MCS). The MCS is a custom coded PC that hosts the bus networkand provides a graphical user interface to depict the operationalparameters and status of all the E-Cats. In a high availabilityapplication, the MCD runs in a ghosted mode with a hot backup PC. Thecost of such a system(a high quality implementation) is substantial. This digital Command andControl(C&C) will comprise a large fraction of the cost ofRossi's 1 megawatt plant. Even the best of such systems is prone to bugs, out ofprofile behavior and hacking attacks. Usually industrial customerswill want to integrate the E-Cat cluster reactor into their factorywide SCADA C&C system. In myopinion, Rossi and Industrial heat have made a mistake in judgment onthis reactor design decision. A simplified fail safe (as in a nuclear reactor) analog basedcontrol system is best suited to the 1 MW E-Cat cluster reactor. On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 12:36 PM, Peter Gluck <peter.gl...@gmail.com> wrote: Dear Friends, when the New Paradigm of LENR will arrive, remember me for this too: http://egooutpeters.blogspot.ro/2014/12/daily-shared-lenr-discoveries-december_9.html It is the daily info here...more daily than info this time. Peter -- Dr. Peter Gluck Cluj, Romania http://egooutpeters.blogspot.com
