> Michel
>
>> I never implied the behavior of the universe or of any of its subsets
> was or could be in the future exactly predictable, we know since QM that
it is not. QM leaves no room for determinism, which is quite an
improvement over classical physics as it gives us an open future. But it
doesn't leave room for free will either.
>
>> Just this random machine's opinion ;-)
>
> Hey I found out how your brain works and it's not exactly random but
maybe
> it is closer to "incommensurable" (whatever that is ;-) :

Hi Jones,

By "incommensurable" I mean the "residual" that's always present in every
calculation, measurement, modelling or simulation of a physical process.
More often than not, this residual has important effects in the
medium/long term. When they are significant, these effects are known by
the generic colloquial term of "butterfly effect", and chaos theory is the
science that study these phenomena and systems which manifest them from
the somewhat "traditional" scientific approach.

>
> http://funstuff.lefora.com/2008/09/15/random-machine-image-i-found/
>
>
> ... but seriously - "Free will" is such a nebulous and loaded term, why
waste your time?
>
> It can be defined in such a way that it clearly exists, or absolutely
doesn't exist, and everything in between - including
> physico-mechanical(i.e.
> deterministic) incommensurability. IOW - It means precisely whatever you
want it to mean... unless you are of the Wiki-persuasion and in the
interest
> of PC need to let everyone put in their 2 cents worth, in 10,000 words
or
> less (not counting the charts).
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will

Ok, I agree that "free will" is not precisely a well defined and simple
expression, potentially meaning many things.

I can give my definition of that which I was referring as "free will",
which may or may not coincide with one of the definitions expressed in
Wikipedia: free will is a conscientiously made choice. That is, an act of
free will occurs when an individual makes a choice based not (or not only)
on the information that's available to him, but also on that which is
dictated by his own conscience. In this sense, free will based choices
supersede rational choices. That is, an individual can make an informed(or
not) decision dictated by her own conscience, which seen from the rational
aspect alone can appear to be irrational, uninformed, or even plain wrong.
Free will also allows us to choose wrongly, that is, deliberately choosing
something we know is wrong or erroneous.

This definition is a little bit stringent, but has the important
consequence that subconscious "decisions" are not acts of free will of an
individual(although conscious irrational or uninformed choices are).

And anyway, my original reasoning applies to all that I consider to be
non-mechanical phenomena, including life and perception, not only
conscience and its cousin, free will.

Mauro

>
> Jones
>
>
> Mauro Lacy wrote re: Michel Jullian's quasi-random opinion:
>
>> I never implied the behavior of the universe or of any of its subsets
was or could be in the future exactly predictable, we know since QM
that it is not. QM leaves no room for determinism, which is quite an
improvement over classical physics as it gives us an open future. But
it doesn't leave room for free will either.
>
>> Just this random machine's opinion ;-)
>
>
> You're equating randomness with incommensurability.
>
>
> That which at the physico-mechanical(i.e. deterministic) level eludes us
as random could be (in some cases) the manifestation of higher forms of
order. In fact(and to be precise) "randomness" could be the "window of
opportunity" by which higher ordered phenomena can manifest in the
physical world. That is: that which is not balanced and equilibrated
(i.e. explained and predicted) at a merely physico-mechanical level,
seeks for equilibrium and balance(and also cries for an explanation) at
a higher level. Life, perception and conscience are then manifestations
of the Universe's "quest for closure" at higher and higher levels of
existence, some of which are not (not necessarily) material.
>
> Mauro
>
>




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