I don't think browser vendors will block the ability to install a custom
root certificate because some corp clients may use it for exactly the same
reason -- creating an HTTPS proxy with fake certs in order to analyze
internal traffic (in the name of monitoring/security).

Browser vendors could make it more difficult to install, so that it would
require the corp IT department to do some magic, or even release two
versions of the browser - corp and general (with blocked uncertified root
certs), but at the end of the day those could be worked around.

The biggest deterrent in my opinion is to educating the users of the
dangers such certs would do (i.e. all your passwords and bank info will be
viewable by ISPs) - thus it would be social rather than purely technical
solution.

On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 1:33 PM Steinsplitter Wiki <
steinsplit...@wikipedia.de> wrote:

> That's shocking...
>
> >> I think this has serious implications for Wikipedia & Wikimedia, as not
> >> only they would be easily able to see which articles people read, but
> >> also steal login credentials, depseudonymize people and even hijack
> >> admin accounts.
>
> Yes, they can de-crypt the traffic. Hopefully browser vendors will
> disallow the root certificate.
> IMHO there isn't much WP can do, expect showing a warning if somebody is
> trying to login
> from the country in question.
>
> --Steinsplitter
>
> ________________________________
> Von: Wikimedia-l <wikimedia-l-boun...@lists.wikimedia.org> im Auftrag von
> Yury Bulka <setthemf...@privacyrequired.com>
> Gesendet: Sonntag, 21. Juli 2019 12:36
> An: wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org <wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org>
> Betreff: [Wikimedia-l] Universal forced HTTPS backdoor in Kazakhstan
>
> I'm sure many have heard about this:
>
> https://thehackernews.com/2019/07/kazakhstan-https-security-certificate.html
>
> Essentially, the government in Kazakhstan started forcing citizens into
> installing a root TLS certificate on their devices that would allow the
> government to intercept, decrypt and manipulate all HTTPS traffic.
>
> Without the centificate, it seems, citizens can't access HTTPS pages (at
> least on some ISPs).
>
> I think this has serious implications for Wikipedia & Wikimedia, as not
> only they would be easily able to see which articles people read, but
> also steal login credentials, depseudonymize people and even hijack
> admin accounts.
>
> Another danger is that if this effort by Kazakhstan will succeed, other
> governments may start doing the same.
>
> I wonder if WMF has any position on this yet?
>
> Best,
> Yury.
>
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