displaying a warning that there is a MITM which reads all passwords and banking information sounds nice, yuri. there even seems to be ways to detect this client-server side: https://www.reddit.com/r/javascript/comments/7ldypq/is_it_possible_to_detect_mitm_by_javascript_in_a/ - you mean something like this would do, yury?
george, the trusted root certificates would be configurable, usually, like for chrome here: https://support.securly.com/hc/en-us/articles/206081828-How-to-manually-install-the-Securly-SSL-certificate-in-Chrome companies pay money to get into this list, so they can easier sell their website certificates. closing down the list for sure leads to some anti-trust legal action in other countries. btw, recently there was a blog post from a developer in iran, saying the same : https://shahinsorkh.ir/2019/07/20/how-is-it-like-to-be-a-dev-in-iran this had an even more surprising aspect - not only would the country block access to some site - but sites itself decided to remove users having a relationship with that country: "Slack team, decided to join the sanctions. They simply deleted every single user who they found out is Iranian! With no real prior notices! Many people has lost their data on Slack and no one was going to do anything!" rupert On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 7:05 PM George Herbert <george.herb...@gmail.com> wrote: > Browser vendors could revoke the root that Kazakh authorities are using for > the scheme. > > On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 5:35 AM Yuri Astrakhan <yuriastrak...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > I don't think browser vendors will block the ability to install a custom > > root certificate because some corp clients may use it for exactly the > same > > reason -- creating an HTTPS proxy with fake certs in order to analyze > > internal traffic (in the name of monitoring/security). > > > > Browser vendors could make it more difficult to install, so that it would > > require the corp IT department to do some magic, or even release two > > versions of the browser - corp and general (with blocked uncertified root > > certs), but at the end of the day those could be worked around. > > > > The biggest deterrent in my opinion is to educating the users of the > > dangers such certs would do (i.e. all your passwords and bank info will > be > > viewable by ISPs) - thus it would be social rather than purely technical > > solution. > > > > On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 1:33 PM Steinsplitter Wiki < > > steinsplit...@wikipedia.de> wrote: > > > > > That's shocking... > > > > > > >> I think this has serious implications for Wikipedia & Wikimedia, as > > not > > > >> only they would be easily able to see which articles people read, > but > > > >> also steal login credentials, depseudonymize people and even hijack > > > >> admin accounts. > > > > > > Yes, they can de-crypt the traffic. Hopefully browser vendors will > > > disallow the root certificate. > > > IMHO there isn't much WP can do, expect showing a warning if somebody > is > > > trying to login > > > from the country in question. > > > > > > --Steinsplitter > > > > > > ________________________________ > > > Von: Wikimedia-l <wikimedia-l-boun...@lists.wikimedia.org> im Auftrag > > von > > > Yury Bulka <setthemf...@privacyrequired.com> > > > Gesendet: Sonntag, 21. Juli 2019 12:36 > > > An: wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org <wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org> > > > Betreff: [Wikimedia-l] Universal forced HTTPS backdoor in Kazakhstan > > > > > > I'm sure many have heard about this: > > > > > > > > > https://thehackernews.com/2019/07/kazakhstan-https-security-certificate.html > > > > > > Essentially, the government in Kazakhstan started forcing citizens into > > > installing a root TLS certificate on their devices that would allow the > > > government to intercept, decrypt and manipulate all HTTPS traffic. > > > > > > Without the centificate, it seems, citizens can't access HTTPS pages > (at > > > least on some ISPs). > > > > > > I think this has serious implications for Wikipedia & Wikimedia, as not > > > only they would be easily able to see which articles people read, but > > > also steal login credentials, depseudonymize people and even hijack > > > admin accounts. > > > > > > Another danger is that if this effort by Kazakhstan will succeed, other > > > governments may start doing the same. > > > > > > I wonder if WMF has any position on this yet? > > > > > > Best, > > > Yury. > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Wikimedia-l mailing list, guidelines at: > > > https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Mailing_lists/Guidelines and > > > https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia-l > > > New messages to: Wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org > > > Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, > > > <mailto:wikimedia-l-requ...@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe> > > > _______________________________________________ > > > Wikimedia-l mailing list, guidelines at: > > > https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Mailing_lists/Guidelines and > > > https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia-l > > > New messages to: Wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org > > > Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, > > > <mailto:wikimedia-l-requ...@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe> > > _______________________________________________ > > Wikimedia-l mailing list, guidelines at: > > https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Mailing_lists/Guidelines and > > https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia-l > > New messages to: Wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org > > Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, > > <mailto:wikimedia-l-requ...@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe> > > > > -- > -george william herbert > george.herb...@gmail.com > _______________________________________________ > Wikimedia-l mailing list, guidelines at: > https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Mailing_lists/Guidelines and > https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia-l > New messages to: Wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org > Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, > <mailto:wikimedia-l-requ...@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe> _______________________________________________ Wikimedia-l mailing list, guidelines at: https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Mailing_lists/Guidelines and https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikimedia-l New messages to: Wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org Unsubscribe: https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikimedia-l, <mailto:wikimedia-l-requ...@lists.wikimedia.org?subject=unsubscribe>
