On 02/04/12 20:34, Ryan Lane wrote: >> It's also possible for governments to snoop on HTTPS communications, >> by using a private key from a trusted CA to perform a >> man-in-the-middle attack. Apparently the government of Iran has done this. >> > > We really should publish our certificate fingerprints. An attack like > this can be detected. An end-user being attacked can see if the > certificate they are being handed is different from the one we > advertise. We could also provide a convergence notary service (or one > of the other things like convergence).
Indeed. Detecting a potential MITM is useless if you can't determine if it's real or not. For instance the switch from RapidSSL to DigiCert certificate was quite suspicious. I don't know how to best publicise it, though. I suppose we would list them somewhere like https://secure.wikimedia.org/servers.html but if nobody knows it's there... _______________________________________________ Wikitech-l mailing list Wikitech-l@lists.wikimedia.org https://lists.wikimedia.org/mailman/listinfo/wikitech-l
