You can go to Acme.com and download the library there. It's a java bean, and from that you can do encrypt decrypt. It's free. If you're in the US, I have a bean which will work with Tango to do that. If you're interested, write me off list.
R
On Tuesday, October 22, 2002, at 10:04 AM, Scott Cadillac wrote:
I store only part of the Credit Card numbers with the first and last 4
digits:
4501....1516
This helps to resolve any reconciliation issues when the customer or vendor
own more than one Credit Card.
Hope this helps. Cheers...
----- Original Message -----
From: "Garth Penglase" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Multiple recipients of list witango-talk" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2002 6:47 AM
Subject: Re: Witango-Talk: Encrypting Credit Card Info within the Database
Yeah, I agree, and also it is a real hassle dealing with a lot of different companies on the net who persist in keeping my credit card details and using them for re-orders when i'd much rather have them email me an invoice with a direct link to submit whichever card I want to use again. Some of these companies force me to store credit card details with them if I want to use their services and while I have been lucky so far I am not naive enough to believe that they are totally secure.I would much prefer that the standard on the net was to re-enter cc details each time. GarthI don't store credit card numbers at all. If the client is a repeat customer, I request that they key in their credit card again. I thought at first I would get a lot of flack for this, but as it turns out, the client is actually more comfortable knowing that the number is not stored anywhere on our servers. I even tout this fact as a selling point. What better way to attract criminal activity and hackers then to have a database filled with good credit card numbers. Just my $0.02Why not just install PGP and use the command line to encrypt anddecrpytthe data? I've done this from within Witango for transmitting sensative
data through the internet.
Robert Shubert
www.witangostore.com
"Fogelson, Steve" wrote:
Thanks for the responses.
Eric,
I looked a little more at the Shopzone's code. They store the key as
a filewithin the web site. Probably not good. If the db's are available to
thehacker, so would the key. The contents of a sample key seem prettysimple:BT_GK1=RHDDzwEAAAACQAAAANpYPBbZhSKJ0OSvdW9MypLdS+UzuAT7D+2U75yKRAPtV 0ZQ0
2mZ2ynXdidrotPUEuIY9N0eCEz22AA+fEd06DNAAAAAlu1KX7S2vKW0PNpdagJS/ WQ0sXFVvgPw2
tfZqOZIeO9xzkjL1zaALW6NWVPsKP7Hf53nTNjRAHj0V9ixa2qWcgAABT_GK2=RHDp9wEAAAACQAAAANpYPBbZhSKJ0OSvdW9MypLdS+UzuAT7D+2U75yKRAPtV 0ZQ0
2mZ2ynXdidrotPUEuIY9N0eCEz22AA+fEd06DNAAAAAUX6yYYqMIIKCVTJ71ZoYMoJVMnvVm hgyg
lUye9WaGDKy7lDyX0u9HT1znlxNyL/O3hUkNXwWpGRYJpj/QCHGKQAA I don't know anything about encryption, but the code kind ofindicates apassword protected public and a private key.
I'm not trying to disseminate any proprietary info for ShopZone. If
I amcrossing the line, someone let me know right away. I am simplyintrigued bytheir "site owner" key generation and was wondering if anyone hasanysuggestions for something outside of Witango that would work within Witango. Maybe this would be a consideration for future enhancement toWitango. Itwould be a nice feature to be able to securely store info in fields of db's. Thanks Steve -----Original Message----- From: Eric Weidl [mailto:ejw@;intersites.com] Sent: Monday, October 21, 2002 3:54 PM To: Multiple recipients of list witango-talk Subject: Re: Witango-Talk: Encrypting Credit Card Info within the Database Hi,Has anyone done this in the shipping cart software an databases?Yes.In their software, you create your own "key" by moving the cursorall overthe screen. I suppose some sort of random character generation.This unique"key" is used to encrypt and decrypt the cc info.Sounds cool.As I have mentioned before, I am writing my own Witango Store. For additional security, I would like to encrypt the cc info fieldswithin thedatabase. I don't expect that someone would hack my sites, but youneverknow. I looked at the Witango <@CIPHER> metatag. it states BitRoll,Caesar, andRot13 are not secure at all, and OneTimePad is only as secure asthe keysare managed and generated.BitRoll, Caesar, and Rot13 are trivial and should be avoided forthispurpose. It would take a hacker only minutes to break them OneTimePad is, in theory, the only 100% secure classic encryptionmethod.Unfortunately, practical issues prevent it from being truly secure.
The name "OneTimePad" refers to the theoretical design of using an
encryption key once and only once. The theory is that each party to
theencryption would have a book or "pad" of papers. Each paper wouldhave adifferent, unique encryption key written on it. Each time you wanttoencrypt a message (e.g. a credit card number), you would take thetop sheetfrom the pad, use it to encrypt the message, then throw the pageaway. Theperson receiving the message would take the top sheet from the book
(whichshould match the sheet you used), and would use it to decrypt themessage.
To demonstrate the issues (and flaws) with the OneTimePad cipher in
thereal world, let's apply it to your situation.
Think of your "submit order" and "review orders" Tango applications
as thetwo players in the encryption game. To start, your application gets
a CCnumber from a user. Your "submit order" application should encryptthatmessage with a unique key and then store it in the database, wherethe"review order" application can later retrieve it. Okay, so the submit order TAF has to encrypt the number and to dothat itneeds a key. Where does it get the key? It could make one up, butthen itwould have to pass that key to the review orders TAF so it wouldknow thekey. How is it going to do that? You could store your keys in thedatabase,but that's not very secure, is it? You could store the keys in afile onthe server, but if a hacker can get to your database, they canprobably getto anything on the computer. Even if you found a secure place to store the keys, you would havetheadditional problem of having to remember which key was used toencryptwhich credit card. Every scenario I've seen for solving that problem
isunsecure. Keep in mind that to meet its theoretical limit, each key
in aOneTimePad solution should be used only one time! That means yourrevieworder TAF could display the un-encrypted CC number once, but then,intheory, it should throw the key away. Not exactly user friendly. This summary is a long winded way of saying there is no very good,completeway of encrypting data in a reversible fashion using Tango's CIPHER
metatag. It could be part of another solution, but I don't think itcould standby itself.
Like anything, security is a continuum, and only you know where your
threshold is on that spectrum.
Another option you might look at are digital certificates.
Finally, I'd be very curious to see an explanation of how Shopzone
storesthe key you say they generate. I understand that they are probably
generating a random key based upon the movements of your mouse over
an area_______________________________________________________________________ _of the screen, but they still have to store that key somewhere. Hope this helps. Eric
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