>From a Javascript dev perspective, specifying an algorithm will make it a hell 
>of of lot easier to implement, instead of having to potentially account for 
>multiples.

Lets use the example of a web app that aggregates social media data - just for 
giggles - and uses WOES to secure the communications to well-defined interfaces

If multiple vendors' websites implement WOES/JOES/JOSE with different 
algorithms, it becomes more complex vs a single, consistent one.




On Aug 5, 2011, at 2:16 PM, Sean Turner wrote:

> So I'll bite on this ;)
> 
> I think we can write the spec to require a particular algorithm choice, but 
> it might make more sense to define the options and then allow the environment 
> in which the solution will be used to specify it's requirements.  But, I 
> believe that is a discussion we'll have while writing the spec.
> 
> spt
> 
> On 8/4/11 9:29 AM, John Bradley wrote:
>> HMAC is requirement for adoption in the JWS use cases.
>> 
>> If we want to describe it as something other than a "Qualified Digital
>> Signature", that is fine as long as it is MTI:)
>> 
>> John B.
>> 
>> 
>> On 2011-08-04, at 9:12 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thu, Aug 4, 2011 at 9:03 AM, Sean Turner <[email protected]
>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>    On 8/2/11 7:13 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
>>> 
>>>        Here is a proposal for the charter based on the discussion in
>>>        the BoF last week and later discussion with Sean Turner.
>>>        Comments, praise, scorn, etc., are welcome.
>>> 
>>>        --Paul and Richard
>>> 
>>>        Javascript Object Signing and Encrypting (jose)
>>>        ==============================__=================
>>> 
>>>        Background
>>>        ----------
>>> 
>>>        Javascript Object Notation (JSON) is a text format for the
>>>        serialization of structured data described in RFC 4627. The
>>>        JSON format is often used for serializing and transmitting
>>>        structured data over a network connection. With the increased
>>>        usage of JSON in protocols in the IETF and elsewhere, there is
>>>        now a desire to offer security services such as encryption and
>>>        digital signatures for data that is being carried in JSON format.
>>> 
>>>        Different proposals for providing such security services have
>>>        already been defined and implemented. This Working Group's
>>>        task is to standardize two security services, encrypting and
>>>        digitally signing, in order to increase interoperability of
>>>        security features between protocols that use JSON. The Working
>>>        Group will base its work on well-known message security
>>>        primitives (e.g., CMS), and will solicit input from the rest
>>>        of the IETF Security Area to be sure that the security
>>>        functionality in the JSON format is correct.
>>> 
>>>        This group is chartered to work on four documents:
>>> 
>>>        1) A Standards Track document specifying how to apply a
>>>        JSON-structured digital signature to data, including (but not
>>>        limited to) JSON data structures. "Digital signature" is
>>>        defined as a hash operation followed by a signature operation
>>>        using asymmetric keys.
>>> 
>>> 
>>>    I just want to make sure that we agree now that a digital
>>>    signature is a hash followed by a signature algorithm (e.g., RSA
>>>    with SHA-256). I've seen a couple of drafts that tried to say an
>>>    HMAC (e.g., HMAC-SHA256) was a digital signature; one called it a
>>>    symmetric key based digital signature algorithm (note this phrase
>>>    didn't get through the IESG).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> An HMAC is not a digital signature, but the spec definitely needs to
>>> be able to cover MAC based authentication.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I know that public key is getting easier as far as computation goes.
>>> But for many applications the non-repudiation you get in digital
>>> signatures is actually undesirable.
>>> 
>>> There are interesting tricks you can do with symmetric crypto that are
>>> much harder to do in public key and end up with some scheme that only
>>> 50 academics in the world can follow and has a security proof that
>>> rest on rather esoteric assumptions.
>>> 
>>> --
>>> Website: http://hallambaker.com/
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> woes mailing list
>>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/woes
>> 
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