On Wed, Mar 07, 2018 at 06:58:36PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> The main purpose is to blacklist the Intel Resource Director Technology MSRs.
> We do not yet virtualise support for guests, but Linux has been observed to
> probe for these MSRs without checking CPUID first.

Bad bad guest..
> The architecturally inaccessable ranges don't need to fall back into the
> legacy ranges, because they are not going to eventually evaluate as
> accessible.
> The Silicon Debug interface will probably never be virtualised for guests, but
> doesn't want to leak through from real hardware.  SGX isn't yet virtualised,
> but likely will be in the future.

> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.w...@oracle.com>

Thank you!

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