On Wed, Mar 07, 2018 at 06:58:36PM +0000, Andrew Cooper wrote: > The main purpose is to blacklist the Intel Resource Director Technology MSRs. > We do not yet virtualise support for guests, but Linux has been observed to > probe for these MSRs without checking CPUID first.
Bad bad guest.. > > The architecturally inaccessable ranges don't need to fall back into the > legacy ranges, because they are not going to eventually evaluate as > accessible. > > The Silicon Debug interface will probably never be virtualised for guests, but > doesn't want to leak through from real hardware. SGX isn't yet virtualised, > but likely will be in the future. > > Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.coop...@citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.w...@oracle.com> Thank you! _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xenemail@example.com https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel