On Fri, Aug 15, 2008 at 3:40 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > The paradox seems trivial, of course. I generally agree with your > analysis (describing how we consider the sentence, take into account > its context, and so on. But the big surprise to logicians was that the > paradox is not just a lingual curiosity, it is an essential feature of > any logic satisfying some broad, seemingly reasonable requirements. > > A logical "sentence" corresponds better to a concept/idea, so bringing > in the lingual context and so on does not help much in the logic-based > version (although I readily admit that it solves the paradox in the > lingual form I presented it in my previous email). The question > becomes, does the system allow "This thought is false" to be thought, > and if so, how does it deal with it? Intuitively it seems that we > cannot think such a silly concept.
> you said "I don't think the problem of self-reference is > significantly more difficult than the problem of general reference", > so I will say "I don't think the frame problem is significantly more > difficult than the problem of general inference." And like I said, for > the moment I want to ignore computational resources... Ok but what are you getting at? I don't want to stop you from going on and explaining what it is that you are getting at, but I want to tell you about another criticism I developed from talking to people who asserted that everything could be logically reduced (and in particular anything an AI program could do could be logically reduced.) I finally realized that what they were saying could be reduced to something along the lines of "If I could understand everything then I could understand everything." I mentioned that to the guys I was talking to but I don't think that they really got it. Or at least they didn't like it. I think you might find yourself on the same lane if you don't keep your eyes open. But I really want to know what where it is you are going. I just read the message that you referred to in OpenCog Prime wikibook and... I really didn't understand it completely but I still don't understand what the problem is. You should realize that you cannot expect to use inductive processes to create a single logical theory about everything that can be understood. I once discussed things with Pei and he agreed that the representational system that contains the references to ideas can be logical even though the references may not be. So a debugged referential program does not mean that the system that the references referred to have to be perfectly sound. We can consider paradoxes and the like. Your argument sounds as if you are saying that a working AI system, because it would be perfectly logical would imply that the Goedel Theorem and the Halting Problem weren't problems. But I have already expressed my point of view on this, I don't think that the ideas that an AI program can create are going to be integrated into a perfectly logical system. We can use logical sentences to input ideas very effectively as you pointed out. But that does not mean that those logical sentences have to be integrated into a single sound logical system. Where are you going with this? Jim Bromer ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=111637683-c8fa51 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
