> And the definition 3.7 that you mentioned *does* match up, perfectly,
> when the {w+, w} truth-value is interpreted as a way of representing
> the likelihood density function of the prob_inh. Easy! The challenge
> is section 4.4 in the paper you reference: syllogisms. The way
> evidence is spread around there doesn't match with definition 3.7, not
> without further probabilistic assumptions.which seems to be because the semantic interpretation of evidence in 3.7 is different in NARS than in PLN or most probabilistic treatments... this is why I suggested to look at how 3.7 is used to model a real situation, versus how that situation would be modeled in prob. theory... having a good test situation in mind might help to think about the syllogistic rules more clearly it needs to be a situation where the terms and relations are grounded in a system's experience, as that is what NARS and PLN semantics are both all about... ben ------------------------------------------- agi Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/ Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=8660244&id_secret=114414975-3c8e69 Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
