On Fri, Oct 10, 2008 at 8:56 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[. . .]
> Yes, in principle, PLN will behave in "Hempel's confirmation paradox" in
> a similar way to other Bayesian systems.
>
> I do find this counterintuitive, personally, and I spent a while trying to
> work
> around it ... but finally I decided that my intuition is the faulty thing.
> As you note,
> it's a very small probability adjustment in these cases, so it's not
> surprising
> if human intuition is not tuned to make such small probability adjustments
> in a correct or useful way...
Well, to take the extreme, suppose we had observe our first crow and
seen that it was black, but later learn that it is in fact the only
crow in existence. The probability adjustment is neither small nor
counterintuitive!
Anyway, perhaps I can try to shed some light on the broader exchange?
My route has been to understand "A is B" as not P(A|B), but instead
P("A is X" | "B is X") plus the extensional equivalent... under this
light, the negative evidence presented by two statements "B is C" and
"A is not C" reduces the frequency of "A is B", but does not obviously
have any bearing on "B is A". (Perhaps it does have some indirect
bearing, for example through some rule of inversion... but of course
the system is not yet even well-defined, so I'll not speculate.)
-------------------------------------------
agi
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