By the way, thanks for all the comments... I'll probably shift gears
as you both suggest, if I choose to continue further.
--Abram
On Fri, Oct 10, 2008 at 10:02 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 10, 2008 at 8:56 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [. . .]
>> Yes, in principle, PLN will behave in "Hempel's confirmation paradox" in
>> a similar way to other Bayesian systems.
>>
>> I do find this counterintuitive, personally, and I spent a while trying to
>> work
>> around it ... but finally I decided that my intuition is the faulty thing.
>> As you note,
>> it's a very small probability adjustment in these cases, so it's not
>> surprising
>> if human intuition is not tuned to make such small probability adjustments
>> in a correct or useful way...
>
> Well, to take the extreme, suppose we had observe our first crow and
> seen that it was black, but later learn that it is in fact the only
> crow in existence. The probability adjustment is neither small nor
> counterintuitive!
>
> Anyway, perhaps I can try to shed some light on the broader exchange?
> My route has been to understand "A is B" as not P(A|B), but instead
> P("A is X" | "B is X") plus the extensional equivalent... under this
> light, the negative evidence presented by two statements "B is C" and
> "A is not C" reduces the frequency of "A is B", but does not obviously
> have any bearing on "B is A". (Perhaps it does have some indirect
> bearing, for example through some rule of inversion... but of course
> the system is not yet even well-defined, so I'll not speculate.)
>
-------------------------------------------
agi
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