McCain-Feingold-Shays-Meehan claims to be about precluding special interest in politics so the public interest can be realized. Not surprisingly, the law aims at advancing various particular interests.
Incumbents have been mentioned in earlier posts. The ban on ads by unions and corporations clearly grew out of many unpleasant experiences that members of Congress had in the fall of 2000. They have now acted to eliminate the source of the unpleasantness. Banning soft money will also reduce electoral competition, which incumbents favor. But incumbency doesn't get you all the way home in explaining why McCain's bill passed. After all, it failed in 2001 to reach a vote when incumbents had the same set of interests. Here are some guesses about the other factors at work in 2002. The Democrats were not certain in 2001 that banning soft money would help them; they had drawn even with the Republicans in raising soft money in the 1999-2000 cycle. Over the course of 2001, it became clear that an early trend of Republicans raising 55% of all soft money and the Dems 45% had reasserted itself. Projected out, banning soft money for the 2003-2004 cycle will avoid a $70 million fundraising gap for the Democrats. All things being equal - which they won't be - the Democrats gained $70 million by banning soft money. Hence, 94% of the House Democratic caucus voted for Shays-Meehan. The coming election. Members apparently worry about voters punishing them for voting against "reform." Sean Therieaux of the University of Texas has done some interesting work showing that members respond to perceived constituent interest in new regulations on political money. Enron. The Enron affair hit Washington and provided an window of opportunity for McCain and company. It was difficult to establish a rational relationship between the Enron bankruptcy and campaign finance reform, but that did not matter. Politics is often irrational especially when issues involve strong elements of a moral narrative. The supporters of Shays-Meehan said that the vote would determine whether a member of Congress was for Enron or for the people. Incumbents are always for measures that both sound high-minded and restrict electoral competition. There's always a strong voting bloc for campaign finance restrictions in Congress. But members are also moved by other factors, including constituent concerns, partisanship, and ideology. (They also make mistakes; the PAC exemption mentioned by Fred was intended to help unions who had the only PACs in 1974; corporate PACs rapidly became effective after "reform"). Enron provided a focusing event that enabled McCain et al. to bring all these factors into line to produce a majority coalition. John Samples Cato -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Fred Foldvary Sent: Sunday, March 03, 2002 3:08 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Campaign finance changes > What determined the 70s wave of campaign finance reforms... what changed in > the meantime, It seems to me that it is in the interest of the elected officials to make voters think that they are limiting the influence of the special interests, while not doing so in substance. Hence the 1970s "reforms" which prohibited direct contributions by corporations yet allowed them to set up PACs which can give unlimited amounts. What changed is that voters now realize, with escalating campaign contributions, that past reforms have not worked, so once again, they will treat the symptoms without changing the cause of the problem. Fred Foldvary ===== [EMAIL PROTECTED] __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Sports - sign up for Fantasy Baseball http://sports.yahoo.com
