At 3:25 PM +0200 10/24/08, Ian G wrote: >Robert Relyea wrote: > > The problem with this idea is that mozilla probably does not want to be >> in the CA business. The overhead of creating a mozilla root key in a >> safe and secure manner is quite involved (and more than doing a key gen > > on a smart card). > >Yes, I see that. To which I'd add, my feeling of the PKIX-layer >solution is equally non-confident: adding root-revocation >capability is likely to be a mess.
Robert: you are already in that business by distributing trust anchors that you have (sometimes) vetted. You are a CA without signing anything, just by distributing a trust anchor repository. Ian: it is mess today, particularly with the issues of deciding which trust anchors can vouch for which sites and services. A trust anchor management protocol is probably a bit more of a mess because it is a protocol and not just a seat-of-the-pants management task as it is today, but it is also hopefully less of a mess because it can be done outside of the software update cycle. --Paul Hoffman _______________________________________________ dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
