Hi Bruno,
There are two different things,
1) a description of a living experience (publicly available to any persons)
and
2) the living experience itself (only available personally, that is, to a
particular person.)
It is easy to get these confused and I no doubt have sometimes confused them
myself.
Computers can deal with descriptions of experience (2), but not an experience
itself (1),
because
a) as Leibniz says, perception of any kind must be a unity of the many in
the one, just as in Plato's All.
b) anything in code or symbolic form is a description, not an experience.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/8/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-07, 09:11:29
Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring ofbottom-up
sensory info
2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal
On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Hi Roger:
... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary
psychology (that study the software or mind)?ssert?hat this is true.
Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology still
does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular mind-body
issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be shown
contradictory(*).
The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is crucial for
the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions and phenomena
with the timeless, reversible, ?athematical ?ature of ?he laws of physics that
by the way, according with M Theory, have also dualities between the entire
universe and the interior of a brane on the planck scale (we can not know if we
live in such a small brane).?
OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at least)
direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the neoplatonists
already did.
I don? assume either if ?his mathematical nature is or not the ultimate nature
or reality
Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp frame.
For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough. Arithmetic
viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe completely.
This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of what being
conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano Arithmetic. In a
sense such theories are like "new person", and it put only more mess in
Platonia.
Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind along
the line of life in space-time) make ?se a sort of duality in category theory
between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as Stephen told me and he
can explain you) .?
Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and matter
are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more that matter
is an iceberg tip of "reality".
Even ?f matter the tip of the iceberg, does the rest of if ?"matter"? ?o we can
know about it this submerged computational nature? which phenomena produce the
submerged part of this iceberg in the one that we perceive?. Multiverse
hypothesis propose a collection of infinite icebergs, but this is a way to
avoid God and to continue with the speculative business. What the computational
nature of reality tries to explain or to avoid? . May be you answered this
questions a number of times, ( even to me and I did not realize it)
By the way, Bruno, you try to demolish physicalism from below by proposing a
computational theory of ultimate reality. I try to demolish ?t from above, by
proposing that perceptions are the effect of computation in living beings for
survival . I assume, and I make use of it, that the comp hypothesis can also be
applied at a level above phisical reality instead of below: a substitution at
the axon firing level could be used to substitute a part of the brain by
computer chips (by making the chips to inject axonic signals) + perhaps some
hormonal control. This substitution level Matrix-style can produce the same
first person indeterminacy and still the computation is made within this
reality, by real computers made of ordinary matter.
This is enough for a discussion.
?
Eventually matter emerge from dreams coherence conditions. Dreams are just the
first person view on the relevant computations which exists by elementary
arithmetic.
For the perception of time or for the ordering of past events in time since
future events are unknown due to the increasing entropy, the mind would make
use of another mathematical structure with a relation of order.
I agree, and N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... } is quite enough, at least with the
addition and multiplication laws. You can define the order by the order
relation x < y, that you can define for example by Ez(x + z = y & ~(z = 0)).
That order is enough to define the order of the computational steps in any
computations.
With computationalism, physics is *literally* entirely reducible to computer
science (= number theory or combinator theory), in a sense similar to the fact
that current biology is literally reducible to chemistry, itself reducible to
physics. Note that computer science refers to number crunching and syntactical
manipulations, but also to the many semantics of programs and computations,
like Scott denotational semantics, or like those derived from mathematical
logic (self-reference theory, model theory, Curry-Howard isomorphism, etc.). ?
Here, the use of self-reference makes it possible to explain the *whole* of
physics: that is the quanta *and* the qualia together, and why they seems (and
are) different. All universal numbers, when looking inward, find that same
universal qualia-quanta distinctions. Note this makes comp testable, as you can
compare the quanta behavior found by machine introspection with what we can
observe, and in that sense, we can say that QM-without-collapse is quite an
ally, up to now, to the comp postulate. Newton physics, once assessed, would
have violate the comp theory.
Bruno
(*)?http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
2012/10/6 Roger Clough
http://www.friesian.com/kant.htm
Kant's "Copernican Revolution"
" Kant's most original contribution to philosophy is his "Copernican
Revolution,"
that, as he puts it, it is the representation that makes the object possible
rather than the object that makes the representation possible. This introduced
the human mind as an active originator of experience rather than just a passive
recipient of perception. Something like this now seems obvious: ?he mind could
be a tabula rasa, a "blank tablet," no more than a bathtub full of silicon
chips
could be a digital computer. Perceptual input must be processed, i.e.
recognized,
or it would just be noise -- "less even than a dream" or "nothing to us," as
Kant
alternatively puts it. ?"
.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/6/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-05, 10:42:30
Subject: Re: A "grand hypothesis" about order, life, and consciousness
On Friday, October 5, 2012 7:05:06 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
So it is reasonable to define life as that which can produce order
out of chaos" *. Since at least higher living beings
also possess consciousness, my "grand" hypothesis is that
life = consciousness = awareness = producing order out of chaos.
I agree Roger. I would add to this understanding however, a logarithmic sense
of increasing quality of experience.
human experience = consciousness > animal experience = awareness > microbiotic
experience = sensation > inorganic experience = persistence of functions and
structures.
I would not say producing order out of chaos because I think that chaos is not
primordial. Nonsense is a mismatch or attenuation of sense, not the other way
around. Order cannot be produced from chaos unless chaos implicitly contains
the potential for order...which makes the production of orderly appearance
really just a formality.
Craig
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