Hi Richard Ruquist True, but to be a monad, you have to be inextended.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/8/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-08, 08:14:23 Subject: Re: experiences vs descriptions of experiences >a) as Leibniz says, perception of any kind must be a unity of the many in the one, just as in Plato's All.> The spherical CYM monads of string theory each maps the entire universe into its 1000 Planck-length diameter with unity of all directions achieved at the point of its center. So despite being extended each CYM has the perception of a Leibniz monad. Richard On Mon, Oct 8, 2012 at 7:19 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno, > > There are two different things, > > 1) a description of a living experience (publicly available to any persons) > > and > > 2) the living experience itself (only available personally, that is, to a > particular person.) > > > It is easy to get these confused and I no doubt have sometimes confused them > myself. > Computers can deal with descriptions of experience (2), but not an experience > itself (1), > because > > a) as Leibniz says, perception of any kind must be a unity of the many in > the one, just as in Plato's All. The spherical CYM monads of string theory each maps the entire universe into its 1000 Planck-length diameter with unity of all directions achieved at the point of its center. So despite being extended each CYM has the perception of a Leibniz monad. Richard > > b) anything in code or symbolic form is a description, not an experience. Deacon would claim that code and/or symbols are 'constraints' that provide the means for future experience. http://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/3/3/290/htm Richard > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/8/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Alberto G. Corona > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-07, 09:11:29 > Subject: Re: What Kant did: Consciousness is a top-down structuring > ofbottom-up sensory info > > > > > > 2012/10/7 Bruno Marchal > > > > On 07 Oct 2012, at 12:32, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > > > Hi Roger: > > > ... and cognitive science , which study the hardware and evolutionary > psychology (that study the software or mind)?ssert?hat this is true. > > > Partially true, as both the mainstream cognitive science and psychology still > does not address the mind-body issue, even less the comp particular mind-body > issue. In fact they use comp + weak materialism, which can be shown > contradictory(*). > > > > > > > > > The Kant idea that even space and time are creations of the mind is crucial > for the understanding and to compatibilize the world of perceptions and > phenomena with the timeless, reversible, ?athematical ?ature of ?he laws of > physics that by the way, according with M Theory, have also dualities between > the entire universe and the interior of a brane on the planck scale (we can > not know if we live in such a small brane).? > > > OK. No doubt that Kant was going in the right (with respect to comp at least) > direction. But Kant, for me, is just doing 1/100 of what the neoplatonists > already did. > > > > > > > I don? assume either if ?his mathematical nature is or not the ultimate > nature or reality > > > Any Turing universal part of it is enough for the ontology, in the comp > frame. For the epistemology, no mathematical theories can ever be enough. > Arithmetic viewed from inside is bigger than what *any* theory can describe > completely. This makes comp preventing any text to capture the essence of > what being conscious can mean, be it a bible, string theory, or Peano > Arithmetic. In a sense such theories are like "new person", and it put only > more mess in Platonia. > > > > > > > > > Probably the mind (or more specifically each instantiation of the mind along > the line of life in space-time) make ?se a sort of duality in category theory > between topological spaces and algebraic structures (as Stephen told me and > he can explain you) .? > > > Many dualities exist, but as I have try to explain to Stephen, mind and > matter are not symmetrical things if we assume comp. The picture is more that > matter is an iceberg tip of "reality". > > > Even ?f matter the tip of the iceberg, does the rest of if ?"matter"? ?o we > can know about it this submerged computational nature? which phenomena > produce the submerged part of this iceberg in the one that we perceive?. > Multiverse hypothesis propose a collection of infinite icebergs, but this is > a way to avoid God and to continue with the speculative business. What the > computational nature of reality tries to explain or to avoid? . May be you > answered this questions a number of times, ( even to me and I did not realize > it) > > > By the way, Bruno, you try to demolish physicalism from below by proposing a > computational theory of ultimate reality. I try to demolish ?t from above, by > proposing that perceptions are the effect of computation in living beings for > survival . I assume, and I make use of it, that the comp hypothesis can also > be applied at a level above phisical reality instead of below: a substitution > at the axon firing level could be used to substitute a part of the brain by > computer chips (by making the chips to inject axonic signals) + perhaps some > hormonal control. This substitution level Matrix-style can produce the same > first person indeterminacy and still the computation is made within this > reality, by real computers made of ordinary matter. > > > This is enough for a discussion. > ? > Eventually matter emerge from dreams coherence conditions. Dreams are just > the first person view on the relevant computations which exists by elementary > arithmetic. > > > > > > > > > For the perception of time or for the ordering of past events in time since > future events are unknown due to the increasing entropy, the mind would make > use of another mathematical structure with a relation of order. > > > > I agree, and N = {0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... } is quite enough, at least with the > addition and multiplication laws. You can define the order by the order > relation x < y, that you can define for example by Ez(x + z = y & ~(z = 0)). > That order is enough to define the order of the computational steps in any > computations. > > > With computationalism, physics is *literally* entirely reducible to computer > science (= number theory or combinator theory), in a sense similar to the > fact that current biology is literally reducible to chemistry, itself > reducible to physics. Note that computer science refers to number crunching > and syntactical manipulations, but also to the many semantics of programs and > computations, like Scott denotational semantics, or like those derived from > mathematical logic (self-reference theory, model theory, Curry-Howard > isomorphism, etc.). ? > > > Here, the use of self-reference makes it possible to explain the *whole* of > physics: that is the quanta *and* the qualia together, and why they seems > (and are) different. All universal numbers, when looking inward, find that > same universal qualia-quanta distinctions. Note this makes comp testable, as > you can compare the quanta behavior found by machine introspection with what > we can observe, and in that sense, we can say that QM-without-collapse is > quite an ally, up to now, to the comp postulate. Newton physics, once > assessed, would have violate the comp theory. > > > Bruno > > > > > (*)?http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > > > > > > 2012/10/6 Roger Clough > > > > http://www.friesian.com/kant.htm > > > Kant's "Copernican Revolution" > > " Kant's most original contribution to philosophy is his "Copernican > Revolution," > that, as he puts it, it is the representation that makes the object possible > rather than the object that makes the representation possible. This > introduced > the human mind as an active originator of experience rather than just a > passive > recipient of perception. Something like this now seems obvious: ?he mind > could > be a tabula rasa, a "blank tablet," no more than a bathtub full of silicon > chips > could be a digital computer. Perceptual input must be processed, i.e. > recognized, > or it would just be noise -- "less even than a dream" or "nothing to us," as > Kant > alternatively puts it. ?" > . > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/6/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Craig Weinberg > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-05, 10:42:30 > Subject: Re: A "grand hypothesis" about order, life, and consciousness > > > > > On Friday, October 5, 2012 7:05:06 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: > > > So it is reasonable to define life as that which can produce order > out of chaos" *. Since at least higher living beings > also possess consciousness, my "grand" hypothesis is that > > life = consciousness = awareness = producing order out of chaos. > > > I agree Roger. I would add to this understanding however, a logarithmic sense > of increasing quality of experience. > > human experience = consciousness > animal experience = awareness > > microbiotic experience = sensation > inorganic experience = persistence of > functions and structures. > > I would not say producing order out of chaos because I think that chaos is > not primordial. Nonsense is a mismatch or attenuation of sense, not the other > way around. Order cannot be produced from chaos unless chaos implicitly > contains the potential for order...which makes the production of orderly > appearance really just a formality. > > Craig > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/y5Z0qwWOARAJ. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > > > > > -- > Alberto. > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > > > > > -- > Alberto. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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