On Tuesday, January 29, 2013 8:48:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 27 Jan 2013, at 15:57, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, January 27, 2013 8:09:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> >> I would like a semi-axiomatic definition of "sensory", to make this more >> palatable. I try to get a theory of sense, and I can't take that notion for >> granted, even if I agree that from the 1p pov, it looks like primitive (but >> that the comp theory can already explained why). >> > > Sensory is primitive, > > > Of course, in the comp theory, sensory is not primitive. It only feels > like primitive, exactly like a part of matter looks like being primitive. >
There's a difference though. Feeling can't feel like feeling if it isn't feeling. Matter can look primitive because matter is inferred from sensory-motor participation - we see public bodies as visual obstacles, we see surfaces and infer volumes, we hear obstructed volume levels, we feel tangible resistance to our touch and can ascribe massive qualities to it. All of these, combined with the consensus agreement of other peer perceivers contribute to a compelling sense of realism, which I would relate to my concepts of significance and perceptual inertia - meta-meta-feeling, sense with bass, like electricity with ground - orientation, and worldliness. You give away comp's weakness by saying that sense 'only feels like primitive', because feeling is already sense. It is actually comp which feels like it's primitive to another set of sensory-motor experiences, that of the verbal-logical thinker. Thought and logic are a special flavor of sense which is optimized to feign objectivity and hide the fact (i.e. Baudrillard's simulacra: a copy with no original: comp takes literally the anonymous impersona of arithmetic as the root of personal sense, rather than the peripheral extension of sense until apotheosis of self-denial). > Comp explains those feeling, except for a tiny part that it still explain > has to remain unexplainable. > Comp doesn't explain any feeling. It explains that if there was a such thing as feeling, then comp has a place to theoretically put it. I maintain that this place is not the true home of feeling, but a sterile partition, an entombment of the almost-utterly-unconscious level of sense. > > > > but comp can't explain it because explanation is only a motive which seeks > to translate one sensory experience into another sensory mode. > > > That's correct, but this cannot been applied validly to refute comp. > Similar remarks for what follows. > You say it cannot be applied, but I see clearly that it must. Craig > > Bruno > > > > > > It's not that you agree from the 1p POV, it is that you have no choice but > to agree - all that your 1p POV consists of is sensory experience. There is > nothing else that it can ever consist of, and of course there is no 3p POV > except in the explanation of multiple 1p experiences. > > I think it's useful to talk about sensory experience as 'afferent > phenomenology' or maybe 'private participation' (whereas motor or motive > activity would be public-facing participation). Note that you can have a > public experience in a dream, but the sense of realism of waking public > experience is, under most conditions, more significant in comparison. > Without the comparison, a dream can seem real, but usually being awake > seems clearly different from a dream. I think that's not because of > differences in the logic of the experiential content, but because of > sub-personal and super-personal (unconscious) sensory connection. > > Sense is always the connection from one 1p state to another or from a 1p > state to its 3p reflection; bridging the literal and the figurative > (understanding), the figurative and the figurative (poetry), or the literal > and the literal (physics), or even the figuratively literal (logic) and the > literally figurative (math). > > Deleuze has some interesting things to say about sense - about how it > exists on the surfaces rather than the depths. I would agree in the way > that synapses are important neurological sites or the junctions of a > transistor are important. I think that sense is the way that the depths > from each other, and/or that division accumulates depth. They are the same > thing, except that the surface is foreground-active from our empirical > perspective as nested participants in timespace, while the surface is > background-irrelevant from an absolute perspective as surfaces require > timespace to manifest. Without timespace, at the absolute scale, there is > no 3p as there is only a totality of depths. > > Craig > > >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> Craig >> >> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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