On 16 Feb 2014, at 06:35, Kim Jones wrote:
On 16 Feb 2014, at 2:06 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
wrote:
On Friday, February 14, 2014 10:23:35 PM UTC-5, Kim Jones wrote:
On 15 Feb 2014, at 1:09 pm, meekerdb <meek...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 2/14/2014 4:24 PM, Kim Jones wrote:
On 14 Feb 2014, at 3:42 pm, Russell Standish
<li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
What about the CMBR? When it was created there were
(presumably) no
observers in existence in the universe. Are you saying it
wouldn't exist if
we hadn't evolved to detect it (e.g. if humans hadn't evolved,
or if we had
never invented radio telescopes) ?
Yes - exactly.
A direct consequence of The Reversal. First comes Mind. Physics
and matter and the 3D holographic farmyard are a long way down
the road.
I hope no one is assuming that it requires something as weird as
a "human" to implement consciousness.
Something as basic as a Boltzmann brain would be in principle,
instantly possible in any universe, surely.
Of course Boltzmann brains are notoriously transient, so we're to
think of the universe (or at least pieces of past light cones)
blinking in and out of existence. Or does that take a Boltzmann
brain plus optic nerves and eyes and a Boltzmann telescope?
Brent
A mind without a "hosting apparatus" is the entity I am struggling
to describe. I have no trouble with the notion that consciousness
can simply exist with no extra qualifiers whatsoever. We are
talking about that which simply exists - when it exists, where it
exists, its characteristics etc. are another story. I don't know
whether such questions are even relevant.
Kim
Existence, when, where, and characteristics would all be conditions
within the primordial capacity for experience.
Craig
OK - so Hameroff and Penrose's conjecture that consciousness was
a property of the primordial universe has legs then? These two are
physicalists though; if I read Russell correctly he is saying this.
Penrose if consistent with comp (even if it is for wrong reason
(misuse of Gödel 1931)).
Comp implies not-physicalism or not-computationalism, and Penrose opts
for physicalism, and abandon computationalism.
(Not Hameroff: he still believes in comp, as he is OK with brain is a
(quantum) computer).
Bruno
Kim
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