On 16 Mar 2014, at 19:30, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:05:50 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote:
Craig,
Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn
it around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness?
It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why
your eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness?
The mirror does not compute.
How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors?
Did I ever say something bad about mirror?
You're saying they don't compute.
Nice you defend this as a compliment!
Just as I say your sun in law doesn't appreciate the flavor of food.
The difference is that my sun in law pretend to appreciate food. The
mirror does not pretend to compute.
The expression "a mirror compute" does not make much sense. There is
category error here. We can make too much sense of such expression.
I have no clue they are intensional agent, but if they ask I will
oblige.
If you hold up a sign that says 'I am an intensional agent' in
backward letters, you will see that they turn them around so you can
see what they are.
Mirror will also evolves, and the intelligent digital mirror can
anticipate on you, or show you with another cut, or some brain scan.
You know that I assume comp, so it should just be obvious to you
that mirror have not the ability of universal computation.
I thought that you are agnostic about comp.
?
Yes, that is why I make clear that I assume it. It is my working
theory. I am agnostic indeed.
How do you know that the mirror doesn't have the ability of
universal computation though?
That expression does not make sense.
Maybe they are just very shy about it? Maybe the mirrors of today
are just babies?
Your analogy flirts with the ridiculous.
Even the Dx = F"xx" method alone, seen as a control structure,
alone, or even some generalization of it, are not Turing universal.
Consciousness is the attribute to the first person, it is
phenomenal, and there is nothing in a mirror which a priori invites
us to such an attribution.
The VCR+camera do invite such an attribution though.
I tend currently to attribute consciousness at the Turing complete
level, and self-consciousness at the Gödel-Löbian one, like when a
K4 reasoner becomes when he visits the Knave Knight Island, or when
a universal Turing machine develops beliefs in enough induction
axioms.
Now, if your theory attributes consciousness to a mirror, and not to
my sun in law, it will look even less convincing to me, Craig.
I don't attribute consciousness to either one, I present the VCR
example as a reductio ad absurdum against comp.
Straw man.
Bruno
Craig
Craig
Bruno
Edgar
On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:
http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/
Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_)
Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any
computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self
awareness? Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way
have a greater chance of developing that awareness than those
which have not? If not, what initial conditions would be necessary
for such an awareness to develop in some machines and how would
those initial conditions appear?
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