On Monday, March 17, 2014 12:19:23 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 16 Mar 2014, at 19:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, March 16, 2014 12:05:50 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 16 Mar 2014, at 13:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, March 16, 2014 3:41:30 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 16 Mar 2014, at 05:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 7:00:48 PM UTC-4, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >>>> >>>> Craig, >>>> >>>> Hmmm, let me see. If I just take my eye out of its socket and turn it >>>> around then I guess by your theory I'd have self awareness? >>>> >>> >>> It's not my theory, but does computationalism provide a reason why your >>> eye looking in the mirror doesn't have self-awareness? >>> >>> >>> The mirror does not compute. >>> >> >> How do you know you're not being racist against mirrors? >> >> >> >> Did I ever say something bad about mirror? >> > > You're saying they don't compute. > > > Nice you defend this as a compliment! > > > > > > Just as I say your sun in law doesn't appreciate the flavor of food. > > > The difference is that my sun in law pretend to appreciate food. The > mirror does not pretend to compute. >
Why not? Any computation which can be output optically can be mirrored. There could be a Turing test in which any computation seen in a mirror that cannot be distinguished from a backward computation on a screen must be considered good enough. > > The expression "a mirror compute" does not make much sense. There is > category error here. We can make too much sense of such expression. > I don't think it is any more of a category error made by comp in attributing feelings to behaviors. Anyways, my example is not a mirror, it is a VCR+camera, as seen in the video. In the video, we see the tape responding visibly to each intrusion on it's 'computation'. If you had a virtual machine that responded in that same way to environmental conditions, would you not say that is evidence of computationalism? > > > > > >> I have no clue they are intensional agent, but if they ask I will oblige. >> > > If you hold up a sign that says 'I am an intensional agent' in backward > letters, you will see that they turn them around so you can see what they > are. > > >> Mirror will also evolves, and the intelligent digital mirror can >> anticipate on you, or show you with another cut, or some brain scan. >> >> You know that I assume comp, so it should just be obvious to you that >> mirror have not the ability of universal computation. >> > > I thought that you are agnostic about comp. > > > ? > Yes, that is why I make clear that I assume it. It is my working theory. I > am agnostic indeed. > If someone said that they were agnostic about God, would I be wrong in thinking that they do *not* assume God's presence or absence? To say that you assume comp and are agnostic about it would seem to be a contradiction. > > > > > How do you know that the mirror doesn't have the ability of universal > computation though? > > > > That expression does not make sense. > Suppose I say that mirrors work because they simulate optical environments, and are in fact universal machines...but again, this 'mirror' example is a straw man. The example I'm working with is the VCR+camera. > > > > > Maybe they are just very shy about it? Maybe the mirrors of today are just > babies? > > > > Your analogy flirts with the ridiculous. > I'm mirroring back to you what my impression is of what you say to me. I say it is obvious that machines are impersonal, cold, mechanical, and that it is obvious that sophisticated technology can be developed that will make them seem less mechanical without actually feeling anything. Your response has been that I'm only looking at machines that exist now, not the more advanced versions. I see no significant between the two arguments, except that mine is facetious. You say that there is no reason why certain kinds of computations could not produce consciousness, and I say there is no reason why certain kinds of configurations of mirrors or cameras couldn't produce computation. > > > > > > >> Even the Dx = F"xx" method alone, seen as a control structure, alone, or >> even some generalization of it, are not Turing universal. Consciousness is >> the attribute to the first person, it is phenomenal, and there is nothing >> in a mirror which a priori invites us to such an attribution. >> > > The VCR+camera do invite such an attribution though. > > >> I tend currently to attribute consciousness at the Turing complete level, >> and self-consciousness at the Gödel-Löbian one, like when a K4 reasoner >> becomes when he visits the Knave Knight Island, or when a universal Turing >> machine develops beliefs in enough induction axioms. >> >> Now, if your theory attributes consciousness to a mirror, and not to my >> sun in law, it will look even less convincing to me, Craig. >> > > I don't attribute consciousness to either one, I present the VCR example > as a reductio ad absurdum against comp. > > > Straw man. > I don't think that it is. It seems to me a particularly equivalent example. If you argue that comp can't be disproved, then I argue that sub-comp can't be disproved either. If the image shakes when the VCR is disturbed, we must assume that self-aware computation is causing it under comp. Craig > > Bruno > > > > > > Craig > > >> >> >> >> >> Craig >> >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Edgar >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, March 15, 2014 6:09:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> <https://31.media.tumblr.com/935c9f6ad77f94164442956d8929da19/tumblr_mncj8t2OCc1qz63ydo10_250.gif> >>>>> http://www.jesseengland.net/index.php?/project/vide-uhhh/ >>>>> >>>>> Have a look at this quick video (or get the idea from this_) >>>>> >>>>> Since the VCR can get video feedback of itself, is there any >>>>> computational reason why this doesn't count as a degree of self >>>>> awareness? >>>>> Would VCRs which have 'seen themselves' in this way have a greater chance >>>>> of developing that awareness than those which have not? If not, what >>>>> initial conditions would be necessary for such an awareness to develop in >>>>> some machines and how would those initial conditions appear? >>>>> >>>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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