On 05 May 2014, at 12:59, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, May 5, 2014 at 8:00 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 04 May 2014, at 21:18, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sun, May 4, 2014 at 6:48 PM, <ghib...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sunday, May 4, 2014 1:43:12 PM UTC+1, telmo_menezes wrote:
The machine:
http://existentialcomics.com/comic/1
Bad news from the doctor:
http://existentialcomics.com/comic/11
Turing test:
http://existentialcomics.com/comic/15
Cheers,
Telmo.
So where do you stand on this Telmo? I suppose I've rather raised
my hopes that your answer, like mine, is not straight forward.
I have no explanation for consciousness. My current inclination is
panpsychism.
The problem here is twofold:
1) what "pan" refers to? (A physical world, then you need to say
"no" to the doctor, Arithmetical truth? perhaps, if the brain is
really a consciousness filter (I am still not sure if this makes
really sense with comp).
2) what *is* psychisme (is it Turing emulable? if yes primitive
matter is an illusion, and physics is a branch of theology, if not
what is it?)
I just mean that I am inclined to see consciousness as fundamental,
Consciousness is fundamental. But not necessarily primitive. Indeed
with computationalism, consciousness is a non computable reality
related to truth or to the intersection of truth and belief.
so I believe this puts me on the Platonic camp.
OK.
The idea that physical reality is a dream of consciousness appeals
to me. I think your theory provides a very compelling path to
understanding how the dream(s) arise, but I don't think it can tell
us what the dreamer is. I'm inclined to take the dreamer as
fundamental, the absolute, god in a non-theistic sense...
Hmm.... I think currently that the dreamers are the 'machines' (that
is intensional number, or number taken relatively to a universal
system, programs if you want, relatively to a computer). "God" seems
to be closer to some universal consciousness. It is what makes the
meaning meaningful. Well, the inner god, at least. The outer god is
the the "ultimate" reality (and is played by the concept of truth in
Plato and comp).
I also like your idea of machines introspecting. This leads us to
something that match our intuitions: a dog is conscious, a tea cup
is not.
OK. Very plausibly so.
I thought so, but was uneasy about how to interpret your use of
"panpsychism".
But not because the dog's brain magically generates consciousness,
just because the dog's brain is capable of machine introspection,
and thus capable of providing content to the dream.
OK. I still would say that the "raw content" of the dream is the
consciousness' business, which eventually will be related to the sheaf
of computations going through the relevant dogs brain.
Bruno
Telmo.
Bruno
Maybe just because I'm just lonely since Liz walked out on
me...this vague cloud of abstraction never seemed so cavernous when
she was around, her 70's punk echoing through the theory of
nothing that - well you know itt wasn't a theory, but maybe it
wasn't nuthin' neither.
Hey, I like 70's punk rock too!
Seriously, I saw a hint of scientific realism in something you said
at some point. Nearly vanished but managed to block my ears when
you started talking about consciousness not between the ears. Don't
do that.
I believe that science is the only valid tool we have to understand
public reality. If you have a good "consciousness between the ears"
theory then... I'm all ears. Other theories are ok too. My position
is that what makes a theory scientific is it's falsifiability,
that's all. It doesn't matter how weird the theory sounds, it only
matters if it makes valid predictions or not. Common sense has been
shown to be misleading many times, and to an amazing degree with
quantum mechanics.
I am not sure that consciousness will ever be investigated by
science, because I'm not sure it will ever be possible to measure
it or test for it's presence. In this case (or meanwhile), we have
to make do with thought experiments and introspection on private
reality.
Telmo.
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