Re: substitution level

Wed, 07 Jun 2017 02:42:07 -0700 


On 06 Jun 2017, at 15:52, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: 

On 05 Jun 2017, at 16:07, Telmo Menezes wrote:

I guess you mean that it does not violate Church thesis.


Yes.

Of course, it can
"do" things impossible to do in real time, or without emulating the subject,
that a classical computer cannot do. For example, it can generate a genuine
random bit. To do emulate this with a non-quantum computer, you need to 

emulate the duplication of the observer, like in the WM duplication.


Well ok, but this part is easy to solve on a classical computer:
https://www.random.org/

:)


Using atmospheric noise as an oracle.
OK, it is better than than using PI or sqrt(2), but is really a computer with an oracle (which by the way has the same theology than a computer 
without oracle, but this is just a note in passing).


On the other hand (and I think Russell said it before here), I am
convinced that randomness plays a role in creativity, and there is
some evidence from the evolutionary computation community that true
randomness is better than pseudo-random generators for this purpose.
It is a complex issue. From the strict theoretical view, it can be proved that the class of problem solvable by a machine using a "true" random oracle is bigger than with any pseudo-random oracle. But the proof I saw is second-recursion ironical, which means that we need to go in Heaven to really solve those problem.
That can play a role in the derivation of physics, though, as the UD* introduce a random oracle in physics. It might be the usual quantum indeterminacy.
Now, prove me that random.org really use the oracle. May be it uses Pi or 
1/Pi. Not sure we could see the difference, if they change the seed
regularly.


There is an independent master thesis on this, but I'm not willing to
read more than 100 pages on the subject and take their word for it :)

It cannot be proved, of course, but there are statistical methods to
measure the "quality" of random numbers. Overall, I believe random.org
passes several independent tests as is well-regarded.
Oh, it is cute for sure. I did need some energy to sop generating random number ... 






Well, thanks for letting me know that you are not serious :)


I was not :)

But if you want real randomness and do not trust a third party, there
are other options:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_random_number_generator



You really seems to want me to become an addict!  :)




but with comp it would have consequences regarding

our "insertion" in reality, so to say. Correct?
I am not sure of what you mean exactly. It would not change the physics, but 

allow us to exploit more directly the FPI.


Yes, I meant simply that our mind would supervene on more branches.
And we would become able to compute Fourier transform on the result of some computations made in all branches. According to Deustch we would be able to detect the "parallel universes". We would be able to find quickly a needle in a stack, and I would have less problem to find my glasses on my dekstop 
:)


:)


I am completely agnostic on this,
but I am not convince by the current argument that there are evidences that
a brain could be a quantum computer. They might be right, but I wait for 

more evidences.


Me too.
Elementary arithmetic is full of quantum computing machineries. I even
suspect that the prime number distribution encodes a universal quantum 

chaotic dovetailing,



Can you explain what you mean by chaotic dovetailing?



Have you heard about quantum chaos?


No, interesting. I'm starting to read about it. I always loved
standard chaos theory. It was one of the first things that profoundly
changed my map of reality.


A not to bad intro is
"http://assets.cambridge.org/97805210/27151/excerpt/9780521027151_excerpt.pdf " 

Thanks!



OK.








Here I meant classical usual dovetailing
on the classical emulation of quantum chaos. From the FPI, it can converge
on "genuine" quantum chaos. There are some evidences, related to the Riemann
hypothesis that the "spectrum" or he critical zero of zeta might correspond
to some quantum chaoitic hamiltonian's eigenvalue. I read that a long time
ago. If quantum chaos is Turing universal, it could even be quantum- Turing
universal, and generate a quantum universal dovetailer. But that would not
solve the mind-body problem. The machine-theological solution can work only 

if we can explain why the measure which would be associated to that
particular quantum chaos win the arithmetical (classical, mechanist) FPI 

problem. The Rieman hypothesis would help but is far from sufficiant.


I am too ignorant on number theory to understand this.
I might say some words on this when I have more time, but I will resist for 
now.





but even if that is true, that should not be used to

justify physics, because we would get the quanta, and not the qualia

(unless

the Riemann hypothesis is shown undecidable in PA (and thus true!).
Only Penrose asks for an explicit non computable physical reduction of 

the

waves, with some role for gravity, and is authentically
non-computationalist. Penrose is coherent with computationalism. He keep
physics as fundamental, but accept the price: the abandon of mechanism. 

But

his argument aganist mechanism is not valid, and already defeated by

machines like PA, ZF, etc.



You mean is maligned statement that the human brain is capable of

accessing truths that lie beyond the Gödelian veil?
I mean all Löbian machine are capable of accessing truths that lie to the 

Gödelian veil, and use this to refute Penrose. Already in 1931, Gödel
realized that PA (or equivalently his own theory P) was proving its own
Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, and is perfectly able to sort out his
own undecidable proposition. Gödel's proof is constructive. It limits the
formalism, but shows them how to improve themselves accordingly, leading to
transfinite possible self-improvement. The machine can find its undecidable
statement, and bet on them with the interrogation mark, or discuss them as 

mysteries (consciousness).


And what leads to machine to drop the interrogation mark?
The confusion between two hypostases. Either willingly, to make easy profit, 
like with the clergy, which can confuse man and god for example, or
unwillingly, by repeating lies, or by pure ignorance. You can see the
machine's enlightenment as the realization that G1* proves the equivalence 
of all hypostases:

G1* proves p  <->  Bp  <-> (Bp & p)  <-> (Bp & Dt)  <-> (Bp & Dt & p)
(p is restricted to the sigma propositions, the leaves of the UD).
But all those equivalence are solution of the formula B x -> ~x. It is true only in God's eye, and false on the terrestrial plane. G1 does not prove any of those equivalence, with some exception, like p -> Bp (keep in mind that 
true sigma proposition are always provable by a universal system).




Of course, they cannot prove them, nor even

assert them as new axiom, but they can understand them, and use them,

notably by becoming "mystical" and "religious",


And artists too, I would say...
And poets. Certainly (as long as they do not believe doing science in the 
process).



and distinguishing *their*
science from *their* religion, in the scientific way, like they can develop
the non-monotonical layers of mind on which Gödel's incompleteness will not
apply: they need only to be able to say something like "Oops, I was wrong",
which is the beginning of the manifestation of intelligence/doubt (already 

present in the Löb formula).


What can one base such bets on? It seems to me that most "betting" is
more or less a Bayesian process, based on priors that are fine-tuned
throughout life in an endless process.
I feel myself more frequentist than Bayesian. Bayes works when we have good reason to have the indifference principle true, but that tend to exist only 
in mathematics.


Humm... but the principle of indifference can be used to bootstrap an
iterative process, where the prior is better approximated as new data
becomes available. I would not be surprised if our brain does that a
lot.
Interesting. I have not much clues on this. In many real-life situation, I am skeptical on prior, but that does not mean that there are not situation where it does make sense. 







For example, I suspect that the
main difference between adherents of different ideologies is that they 
have different priors for questions such as ("how likely is one to
become rich while being ethical"; "how likely is the government to be
corrupt"; etc.). How does one estimate probabilities beyond the veil?
I would say that there are no probabilities at all in such context, only 
credibilities and plausibilities.
I will judge a government corrupt when he lies on something for a long time, or make dubious propositions. It will be a personal judgment, unless I can 
rove that it lies on something specific.


Ok, but you think it's a lie for some reason. Couldn't that come from
other probabilities that you estimate?
By default, the normal gaussian on almost all physical or concrete measurements, yes. 







Or do you think that this sort of betting transcends probabilistic
thinking?
I think that an ideology, like a theory, is based on judgements. It is based 
on personal intuition, related to one personal life, experience and
character, and our personal influence (parents school, ...).


Agreed.


Probabilies can
be used to study population, make poll, etc. But will not work to get an information on particular individuals. For ideas, in the human science, we can hardly build the Omega space (the universe of elementary statistical 
results), unless  we use very special protocols, like with the
WM-duplication, or applying quantum mechanics on oneself.
There are as much notion of probability and credibility than there are modal logic for which []p entails <>p. <>p is a default meta-hypothesis. Somehow it assumes that when you throw a dice, 1) there is some reality in which the dice will fall; 2) you will exclude all anomalies (like the dice falling and 
rolling under the heavy wardrobe).


Ok.
That is why to get probability, we need to conjunct the <>t to the box []p. To have at least one universe/computation/situation accessible to verify the 
prediction.


Ok.



Good. Best,


Bruno





Telmo.


Bruno





Telmo.

Bruno







T.


Bruno






Telmo.


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