> I guess you mean that it does not violate Church thesis. Yes.
> Of course, it can > "do" things impossible to do in real time, or without emulating the subject, > that a classical computer cannot do. For example, it can generate a genuine > random bit. To do emulate this with a non-quantum computer, you need to > emulate the duplication of the observer, like in the WM duplication. Well ok, but this part is easy to solve on a classical computer: https://www.random.org/ :) >> but with comp it would have consequences regarding >> our "insertion" in reality, so to say. Correct? > > > I am not sure of what you mean exactly. It would not change the physics, but > allow us to exploit more directly the FPI. Yes, I meant simply that our mind would supervene on more branches. > I am completely agnostic on this, > but I am not convince by the current argument that there are evidences that > a brain could be a quantum computer. They might be right, but I wait for > more evidences. Me too. >>> Elementary arithmetic is full of quantum computing machineries. I even >>> suspect that the prime number distribution encodes a universal quantum >>> chaotic dovetailing, >> >> >> Can you explain what you mean by chaotic dovetailing? > > > Have you heard about quantum chaos? No, interesting. I'm starting to read about it. I always loved standard chaos theory. It was one of the first things that profoundly changed my map of reality. > Here I meant classical usual dovetailing > on the classical emulation of quantum chaos. From the FPI, it can converge > on "genuine" quantum chaos. There are some evidences, related to the Riemann > hypothesis that the "spectrum" or he critical zero of zeta might correspond > to some quantum chaoitic hamiltonian's eigenvalue. I read that a long time > ago. If quantum chaos is Turing universal, it could even be quantum-Turing > universal, and generate a quantum universal dovetailer. But that would not > solve the mind-body problem. The machine-theological solution can work only > if we can explain why the measure which would be associated to that > particular quantum chaos win the arithmetical (classical, mechanist) FPI > problem. The Rieman hypothesis would help but is far from sufficiant. I am too ignorant on number theory to understand this. >>> but even if that is true, that should not be used to >>> justify physics, because we would get the quanta, and not the qualia >>> (unless >>> the Riemann hypothesis is shown undecidable in PA (and thus true!). >>> >>> Only Penrose asks for an explicit non computable physical reduction of >>> the >>> waves, with some role for gravity, and is authentically >>> non-computationalist. Penrose is coherent with computationalism. He keep >>> physics as fundamental, but accept the price: the abandon of mechanism. >>> But >>> his argument aganist mechanism is not valid, and already defeated by >>> machines like PA, ZF, etc. >> >> >> You mean is maligned statement that the human brain is capable of >> accessing truths that lie beyond the Gödelian veil? > > > I mean all Löbian machine are capable of accessing truths that lie to the > Gödelian veil, and use this to refute Penrose. Already in 1931, Gödel > realized that PA (or equivalently his own theory P) was proving its own > Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, and is perfectly able to sort out his > own undecidable proposition. Gödel's proof is constructive. It limits the > formalism, but shows them how to improve themselves accordingly, leading to > transfinite possible self-improvement. The machine can find its undecidable > statement, and bet on them with the interrogation mark, or discuss them as > mysteries (consciousness). And what leads to machine to drop the interrogation mark? > Of course, they cannot prove them, nor even > assert them as new axiom, but they can understand them, and use them, > notably by becoming "mystical" and "religious", And artists too, I would say... > and distinguishing *their* > science from *their* religion, in the scientific way, like they can develop > the non-monotonical layers of mind on which Gödel's incompleteness will not > apply: they need only to be able to say something like "Oops, I was wrong", > which is the beginning of the manifestation of intelligence/doubt (already > present in the Löb formula). What can one base such bets on? It seems to me that most "betting" is more or less a Bayesian process, based on priors that are fine-tuned throughout life in an endless process. For example, I suspect that the main difference between adherents of different ideologies is that they have different priors for questions such as ("how likely is one to become rich while being ethical"; "how likely is the government to be corrupt"; etc.). How does one estimate probabilities beyond the veil? Or do you think that this sort of betting transcends probabilistic thinking? Telmo. > Bruno > > > > > >> >> T. >> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Telmo. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an >>>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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