On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 13:37, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Mon, May 22, 2023 at 11:13 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> >> >> On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 10:48, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, May 22, 2023 at 8:42 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, 23 May 2023 at 10:03, Terren Suydam <terren.suy...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> it is true that my brain has been trained on a large amount of data - >>>>> data that contains intelligence outside of my own. But when I introspect, >>>>> I >>>>> notice that my understanding of things is ultimately rooted/grounded in my >>>>> phenomenal experience. Ultimately, everything we know, we know either by >>>>> our experience, or by analogy to experiences we've had. This is in >>>>> opposition to how LLMs train on data, which is strictly about how >>>>> words/symbols relate to one another. >>>>> >>>> >>>> The functionalist position is that phenomenal experience supervenes on >>>> behaviour, such that if the behaviour is replicated (same output for same >>>> input) the phenomenal experience will also be replicated. This is what >>>> philosophers like Searle (and many laypeople) can’t stomach. >>>> >>> >>> I think the kind of phenomenal supervenience you're talking about is >>> typically asserted for behavior at the level of the neuron, not the level >>> of the whole agent. Is that what you're saying? That chatGPT must be >>> having a phenomenal experience if it talks like a human? If so, that is >>> stretching the explanatory domain of functionalism past its breaking point. >>> >> >> The best justification for functionalism is David Chalmers' "Fading >> Qualia" argument. The paper considers replacing neurons with functionally >> equivalent silicon chips, but it could be generalised to replacing any part >> of the brain with a functionally equivalent black box, the whole brain, the >> whole person. >> > > You're saying that an algorithm that provably does not have experiences of > rabbits and lollipops - but can still talk about them in a way that's > indistinguishable from a human - essentially has the same phenomenology as > a human talking about rabbits and lollipops. That's just absurd on its > face. You're essentially hand-waving away the grounding problem. Is that > your position? That symbols don't need to be grounded in any sort of > phenomenal experience? > It's not just talking about them in a way that is indistinguishable from a human, in order to have human-like consciousness the entire I/O behaviour of the human would need to be replicated. But in principle, I don't see why a LLM could not have some other type of phenomenal experience. And I don't think the grounding problem is a problem: I was never grounded in anything, I just grew up associating one symbol with another symbol, it's symbols all the way down. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXViwvq0TnbJXnPt7VVDoy8zASJyZeq-O3ZpOpMSx6cwg%40mail.gmail.com.
