Actually, this distinction is pretty elementary with regard to neuroscientific studies; it really isn't something that has just never occurred to the researchers. Libet's studies, for example, looked directly at the apparent time lag between decisions made on the unconscious level and when they came to the subjects' conscious awareness. That's what his research was designed to measure.
And aside from the fact that there are umpty examples of actions taken consciously to alter unconscious processes, determinism per se would simply assume the decision to engage in those actions was itself determined. IOW, that one takes such actions in no way validates free will as far as determinists are concerned. (BTW, determinism is a metaphysical idea, not a scientific one. It can't be tested or measured. The emerging scientific notion is that free will is an illusion created by the brain; has nothing to do with "fate" or "God's will.") I think that the neuroscientists might be confusing the distinction between *conscious* decision-making and *unconscious* decision-making when trying to "prove" their contention that we have no free will. *Both* forms of decision-making are present at all times.
