Hi, Dave, 

 

Thanks for taking the time to lay this out.  I wonder what you call the present 
status of “natural selection” as a metaphor. In this case, the analogues 
between the natural situation and the pigeon coop remain strong, but most users 
of the theory have become ignorant about the salient features of the breeding 
situation.  So the metaphor hasn’t died, exactly; it’s been sucked dry of its 
meaning by the ignorance of its practitioners.  

 

I balk at the idea of a “conceptual metaphor”.  It’s one of those terms that 
smothers its object with love.  What is the contrast class?  How could a 
metaphor be other than conceptual?  I think the term  subtly makes a case for 
vague metaphors.  In my own ‘umble view, metaphors should be as specific as 
possible.  Brain/mind is a case two things that we know almost nothing about 
are used as metaphors for one another resulting in the vast promulgation of 
gibberish. Metaphors should sort knowledge into three categories, stuff we know 
that is consistent with the metaphor, stuff we know that is IN consistent with 
the metaphor, and stuff we don’t know, which is implied by the metaphor.  This 
last is the heuristic “wet edge” of the metaphor.  The vaguer a metaphor, the 
more difficult it is to distinguish between these three categories, and the 
less useful the metaphor is.  Dawkins “selfish gene” metaphor, with all its 
phony reductionist panache, would not have survived thirty seconds if anybody 
had bothered to think carefully about what selfishness is and how it works.  
See, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311767990_On_the_use_of_mental_terms_in_behavioral_ecology_and_sociobiologyThTh

 

This is why it is so important to have something quite specific in mind when 
one talks of layers.   Only if you are specific will you know when you are 
wrong.  

 

I once got into a wonderful tangle with some meteorologists concerning 
“Elevated Mixed Layers”  Meteorologists insisted that  air masses, of different 
characteristics, DO NOT MIX.   It turns out that we had wildly different models 
of “mixing”.  They were thinking of it as a spontaneous process, as when sugar 
dissolves into water; I was thinking of it as including active processes, as 
when one substance is stirred into another.  They would say, “Oil and water 
don’t mix.”  I would say, “bloody hell, they do, too, mix.  They mix every time 
I make pancakes.”  The argument drove me nuts for several years because any 
fool, watching hard edged thunderheads rise over the Jemez, can plainly see 
both that the atmosphere is being stirred AND that the most air in the 
thunderhead is not readily diffusing into the dryer descending air around it.  
From my point of view, convection is something the atmosphere does, like 
mixing; from their point of view, convection is something that is DONE TO the 
atmosphere, like stirring.  You get to that distinction only by thinking of 
very specific examples of mixing as you deploy the metaphor.  

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

 <http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/> 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Prof David West
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2017 11:36 AM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Model, Metaphor, Analogy

 

long long ago, my master's thesis in computer science and my phd dissertation 
in cognitive anthropology dealt extensively with the issue of metaphor and 
model, specifically in the area of artificial intelligence and cognitive models 
of "mind." the very first academic papers I published dealt with this issue 
(They were in AI MAgazine, the 'journal of record' in the field at the time.

 

My own musings were deeply informed by the work of Earl R. MacCormac: A 
Cognitive Theory of Metaphor and Metaphor and Myth in Science and Religion.

 

MacCormac argues that metaphor 'evolves' from "epiphor" the first suggestion 
that something is like something else to either "dead metaphor" or "lexical 
term" depending on the extent to which referents suggested by the first 
'something'  are confirmed to correlate to similar referents in the second 
"something." E.G. an atom is like a solar system suggests that a nucleus is 
like the sun and electrons are like planets plus orbits are at specific 
intervals and electrons can be moved from one orbit to another by adding energy 
(acceleration) just like any other satellite. As referents like this were 
confirmed the epiphor became a productive metaphor and a model, i.e. the Bohr 
model. Eventually, our increasing knowledge of atoms and particle/waves made it 
clear that the model/metaphor was 'wrong' in nearly every respect and the 
metaphor died. Its use in beginning chemistry suggests that it is still a 
useful tool for metaphorical thinking; modified to "what might you 
infer/reason, if you looked at an atom as if it were a tiny solar system."

 

In the case of AI, the joint epiphors — the computer is like a mind, the mind 
is like a computer — should have rapidly become dead metaphors. Instead they 
became models "physical symbol system" and most in the community insisted that 
they were lexical terms (notably Pylyshyn, Newell, and Simon). To explain this, 
I added the idea of a "paraphor" to MacCormac's evolutionary sequence — a 
metaphor so ingrained in a paradigm that those thinking with that paradigm 
cannot perceive the obvious failures of the metaphor.

 

MacCormac's second book argues for the pervasiveness of the use and misuse of 
metaphor and its relationship to models (mathematical and iillustrative) in 
both science and religion. The "Scientific Method," the process of doing 
science, is itself a metaphor (at best) that should have become a dead metaphor 
as there is abundant evidence that 'science' is not done 'that way' but only 
after the fact as if it had been done that way. In an Ouroborosian twist, even 
MacCormac;s theory of metaphor is itself a metaphor.

 

If this thread attracts interest, I think the work of MacCormac would provide a 
rich mine of potential ideas and a framework for the discussion. Unfortunately, 
it mostly seems to be behind pay walls — the books and JSTOR or its ilk.

 

dave west

 

 

 

On Fri, Jun 9, 2017, at 03:11 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:

I meant to spawn a fresh proto-thread here, sorry.

 

Given that we have been splitting hairs on terminology, I wanted to at least 
OPEN the topic that has been grazed over and over, and that is the distinction 
between Model, Metaphor, and Analogy.   

 

I specifically mean 

 

1.      Mathematical Model <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_model> 
2.      Conceptual Metaphor <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conceptual_metaphor> 
3.      Formal Analogy <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analogy> 

I don't know if this narrows it down enough to discuss but I think these three 
terms have been bandied about loosely and widely enough lately to deserve a 
little more explication?

I could rattle on for pages about my own usage/opinions/distinctions but trust 
that would just pollute a thread before it had a chance to start, if start it 
can.

A brief Google Search gave me THIS reference which looks promising, but as 
usual, I'm not willing to go past a paywall or beg a colleague/institution for 
access (I know LANL's reference library will probably get this for me if I go 
in there!).

http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9780631221081_chunk_g97806312210818

 

 

 

 

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