Sorry Eugen, I am still not getting it. You will author content in isolation, without reference to any information at all? Or perhaps in a library with books on paper? When I author something I constantly refer to other material.
Lets say you write something, then burn it to CD and transfer it to a networked system and send it out. Isn't it now subject to traffic analysis and perhaps malware injection? It is only secure if you author it and never move it from the air gaped computer. If you take Griffin's point that connecting a USB stick, or external hard drive is dangerous, and that PDFs are dangerous then I don't think you can do much with that air gaped computer. I am asking a serious question, what are realistic use cases for an air gaped computer? Thanks -- Matt Johnson On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 12:32 PM, Eugen Leitl <eu...@leitl.org> wrote: > On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 10:54:34AM -0800, Matt Johnson wrote: >> I fail grasp the utility of such and offline computer. If you keep a > > You must have nothing to hide, then. Some of us do. > >> computer air gaped as you describe you will not be able to do much >> with it. > > Gee, how about authoring content, and encrypting it, and > transferring it via sneakernet to your insecure system. > That way untrusted network doesn't start at your router, > but at your main machine. > >> What do you want the air gaped computer for? > > Gee, this is exactly the kind of questions which > TLAs would love to have answered. But no longer > can exfiltrate stealthily. That alone should give > you sufficient reason to pay for an air-gapped > computer. > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of > list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, > change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > compa...@stanford.edu. -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
